Assisted dying: an ethics of care perspective by Fine, Laurel
  
  
ASSISTED DYING; AN ETHICS OF CARE PERSPECTIVE 
 
by 
 
 
LAUREL FINE 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Masters of 
Jurisprudence 
Birmingham Law School 
College of Arts and Law 
University of Birmingham 
September 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to reflect the role of care in response to requests for assistance to die. 
This thesis will seek to illustrate that it is fundamental that regulatory frameworks concerning 
assisted dying should attend to the reality of care. In the first chapter, this thesis will establish 
a care-based ethic which reflects assisted dying. Building on this argument, this thesis then 
moves to an analysis of the current regulatory frameworks associated with assisted dying 
namely; the failed attempt at statutory legislation and the Director of Public Prosecution 
Guidelines. This thesis will then analyse contemporary cases concerning the minimally 
conscious patient and judicial reasoning in the most recent Supreme Court case, Nicklinson.  
Ultimately, this thesis will demonstrate that a regulatory framework concerning assisted 
dying must attend to the realities of care in both the private and public domain and recognise 
the influence of care on both legislative safeguards and the state provision of care.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades assisted dying has seized public, judicial and parliamentary 
attention. As the recent case of Noel Conway v Secretary of State for Justice1 illustrates, 
requests for the legalisation of assisted dying continues with some momentum. This is due to 
medical advances which enable individuals to live longer, yet with a reduced and often 
declining quality of life. Because of these medical advances an assisted death has been 
advocated as an option for these individuals. Notably in 2014, the Supreme Court disallowed 
the appeal made by Mr Nicklinson to end his life which required assistance from a health 
care professional2. However, two of the nine Supreme Court justices were willing to make a 
declaration of incompatibility and three other justices had temporal or evidential issues with 
the appeals raised. Nicklinson relied on fundamental human rights protected by EU law and 
followed a trend to establish rights-based arguments in the health care setting.3 
Given these two above points, it is arguable whether the legalisation of assisted dying is 
imminent. Yet since 2014 only two cases (Conway being one) have come to judicial 
attention.4 These cases reflect rights-based arguments found in Nicklinson and rejected 
parliamentary bills.5 As a result, there is now an increasingly complex and inconsistent 
system of implicit and informal regulation. I argue that the practice of care and relational 
dynamics, which are inextricably linked to the everyday lives of those who require assistance 
to end their life, is ignored in both parliamentary debate and judicial reasoning. Though both 
																																																						
1 [2017] EWHC640 (Admin). 
2 R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice 
(Respondent) [2014] UKSC 38 [2014] UKSC 38.  The facts of this case will be discussed 
further in Chapter Two. 
3 See further; J McHale and T K Hervey, European Union health law : themes and 
implications (2015) CUP. 
4 Conway (n1).  
5 Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2013-14 
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parliament6 and the courts7 have dismissed any formal legal regulation for assisted dying, 
regulation of this scenario remains implicit, complex and overlooks the practice of care.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to explore the practice of labour associated care, be it 
physical, emotional, fiscal and organisational, on the individual who requests assistance. 
From this perspective, this thesis will map the type of care and relational dynamics which are 
appropriate to the care actors and state agencies involved with the individual who requests 
assistance. This is an important perspective to take as it offers a new approach in 
understanding the effects of regulation on the individual who requests assistance and how a 
care-based ethic can reconceptualise our approach to assisted dying.  
This thesis will therefore begin with an evaluation of the current law concerning assisted 
dying. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the de facto legalisation caused by the Director 
of Public Prosecution’s guidance in 2014. The chapter will first examine the attempts of 
legislation in Parliament. The “eligibility criteria” contained in these failed Bills will be 
evaluated in order to establish which individuals should be served by assisted dying 
frameworks. This will include an analysis of how suffering is conceptualised and the 
unnecessary association this has with medical diagnoses.  
It will then be demonstrated that under the Director of Public Prosecution’s (DPP) guidance a 
specific circumstance which is inextricably linked to (nuclear) familial assistance and the 
concept of compassion has been established. What is unclear is the type of assistance which 
is permissible. Additionally, individuals who do not have access to familial assistance are 
without assistance and support. Ultimately in Chapter One I will argue that the DPP’s 
guidelines conceal the justificatory argument behind the guidelines which is the right to an 
autonomous decision to end one’s life. Where appropriate I will use the example of 
																																																						
6 Parliament have debated assisted dying at least six times in the last nine years. See further; 
Nicklinson (n2). 
7 ibid. 
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individuals who were living with dementia to highlight the role of autonomous decision-
making and suffering as part of the current regulatory frameworks.  
In Chapter Two it will be illustrated that the type of care appropriate for the individual who 
requests assistance is dependent on each care provider. This will be achieved by first arguing 
that the type of care–based ethic appropriate for the individual that requires assistance to end 
their life is premised on an understanding of process-based autonomy. Based on Friedman 
and Meyer’s respective theories, the reflective and relational qualities that are part of a 
process-based autonomy framework will be discussed. Following this, I will establish a 
gender-neutral and non-normative understanding of familial care and discuss how this 
approach recognises the realities of caring for the individual who requests assistance. This 
discussion has the potential to broaden regulatory framework. This chapter will also establish 
a principled approach for health and social care professionals. By using this approach, the 
current perspective of care professionals’ roles in response to the individual who requests 
assistance will be analysed. This will result in arguing that health and social care 
professionals should, under a principled care-ethic, play a more substantial role in supporting 
the individual who requests assistance. This chapter’s analysis will also include an analysis of 
how the state facilitates care both in the private and public domain and in turn how this 
produces normative definitions of care practices. By applying a care ethic to separate care 
actors this chapter will illustrate how the integration of these care roles play an important part 
in the assisted dying debate which will be built on in further chapters.  
In Chapter Three discussion will turn to contemporary medical law cases concerning 
individuals in a minimally conscious state (MCS). Here I will evaluate the conceptualisation 
of withdrawing treatment as a model of passive euthanasia in judicial reasoning. To achieve 
this, I will rely on an analysis of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) and how this dictates 
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judicial interpretation. This will primarily focus on the best interest test at s4 of the MCA.8 
By focussing on this test and using the reasoning developed in University Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust v Aintree9 and Briggs v Briggs respectively10 I will argue that a substituted 
judgment test is increasingly being deployed as a mechanism to determine what is in the best 
interest of the patient. The final part of this chapter will be given over to an analysis of the 
Supreme Court decision in Nicklinson.11 The discussion of judicial reasoning in this case is 
used for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the theoretical arguments concerning vulnerability 
and the risk of duress when regulating assisted dying. Secondly, the circumstance of Mr 
Nicklinson and his fellow appellants illustrate important legal inconsistencies between how 
we perceive and apply the law to individuals who have capacity but refuse treatment, and 
those individuals who lack capacity to do so. This issue indicates how vulnerability 
arguments apply normative expectations of those with disabilities. Ultimately in Chapter 
Three I will demonstrate that the regulatory framework concerning assisted dying ignores the 
care-based and relational realities of requests for assistance.  
In the final chapter the care-based ethic established in Chapter Two will be applied to the 
current legal framework concerning assisted dying discussed in Chapter One. I will use four 
paradigmatic scenarios concerning requests for an assisted death. This will begin with 
individuals who have both physical capacity and mental capacity. In discussing this scenario, 
I will apply a care-based approach to the state’s responsibility for care. I will argue that a 
care-based approach would not support request for assistance in this instance. I will then 
focus on the individual who lacks physical capacity but has mental capacity. This will be 
contrasted with individuals living with dementia and advance directives for requests for 
																																																						
8 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s4.  
9 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v David James (by his litigation friend, 
the Official Solicitor), May James, Julie James [2013] EWCA Civ 65 
10 Briggs v Briggs [2013] UKSC 67 
11 Nicklinson (n2).  
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assistance to die. Additionally, I will develop a framework to establish how a process-based 
approach to autonomy and capacity can be incorporated into regulation. The third part of this 
chapter will then focus on the complexities of advance requests for assistance from those who 
are living with dementia. I will use an analysis of how a care-based approach can balance 
previous wishes and feelings against current wishes and feelings. The final part of this 
chapter will then focus on assisted dying in respect of individuals who lack both mental 
capacity and physical capacity such as MCS or PVS. This will include an analysis of how 
various care theorists conceptualise “intending death” and the emphasis placed on a 
substituted judgment above a best interest test. I also include a discussion of the role of health 
care professionals in response to requests for assistance and how recognising relational 
interaction could support arguments for a rights-based analysis.  
While the ultimate approach in this thesis is to understand the care-based reality of the 
individual who requests assistance to end their life, the approach taken extends beyond just 
this. My aim is to draw out the legal and ethical nuances between the paradigmatic scenarios 
that exist in the context of assisted dying. By doing this I will illustrate that the traditional 
rights-based approach to regulating assisted dying is inferior to a care-based approach, even 
if the latter requires a more complex application of legal regulation. Death, dying and care are 
not isolated phenomena, they are an integrated set of practices and ideals. Care should not be 
side-lined in the assisted dying debate. Rather, care is an integral component in 
reconceptualising a regulatory framework for assisted dying.  
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT ARE THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS CONCERNING 
ASSISTED DYING: STATUTORY REGULATION 
1. Introduction 
This section will analyse the legislative frameworks that govern assisted dying law. This will 
be achieved by first discussing the historical bases to the attempted legislative Bills. This 
analysis will critique the criteria established in such bills. Building on this, the chapter will 
also discuss the Director of Public Prosecution’s guidelines as an additional aid to the current 
legislative framework. Using the Decision on the Death of Daniel James published by the 
DPP this chapter will critique the use of compassion, the role of the family and the concept of 
assistance concerning requests for assistance.   
2. The Historical Background of Assisted Dying Law 
Today, with advances in science and healthcare allowing individuals to live longer, yet often 
with a declining quality of life, choosing to die often becomes a desired option.12 The current 
prohibition on assisted suicide therefore becomes an issue. The historical context of assisted 
dying legislation will be provided here in order to analyse the current assisted dying 
regulation in the remaining part of this chapter. Section two of the Suicide Act 1961 states 
that criminal liability for complicity in another’s suicide will be established if the assister;  
‘(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of 
another person, and (b)D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at 
suicide.’13The Suicide Act decriminalised suicide itself. However in England and Wales 
assisting someone to die remains illegal and carries with it a maximum of fourteen years in 
prison.14 There have been relatively few prosecutions under the Act, with only one case of 
																																																						
12 See further; A Chapple et al, ‘What people close to death say about euthanasia and assisted 
dying: A qualitative study’ (2006) JMed 32 706-710. 
13 The Suicide Act 1961 s2. 
14 ibid s.1. 
7 
 
attempted suicide successfully prosecuted in 2013.15 Although the courts have been reluctant 
to make statements in advance of particular acts, criminal liability has been broadly defined 
as ‘specific assistance to a particular individual who considers suicide at that time.16 Section 
2(4) requires prosecution ‘by or with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.’17The DPP’s specific guidelines will be evaluated in section four.  
Between 2003 and 2006, Lord Joffe unsuccessfully made four attempts to legislate in favour 
of assisted dying.18  In 2015 Lord Falconer’s Bill (Assisted Dying (No1) Bill) was introduced 
in the Lords.19 The Bill drew heavily from The Death with Dignity Act in force in Oregon20 
and took much the same approach to Lord Joffe’s Bill. The Act would have legalised the 
provision of medication by a registered medical practitioner or a registered nurse to those 
over eighteen with capacity, suffering from a terminal illness with a six-month prognosis or 
less to enable the individual to end their life. The theoretical underpinning of the Bill reflects 
the capacity-based difficulties which arise when attempting to regulate assisted dying. As 
Otlwoksi argues, the prospect of future legislation will only be successful if it is justified by 
self-determination.21 Otlowksi further states that the principle of liberty should be the sole 
consideration when regulating assisted dying. This is because the individual’s choice is 
premised on the subjective assessment of their own particular situation. The only limit to this 
																																																						
15 DPP, Policy for prosecutors in respect of cases of encouraging or assisting suicide (CPS, 
October 2014) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.pdf> accessed 13 
March 2017. 
16 See further; Attorney General v Able and Others [1983] QBD 28 APR. In this case the 
general distribution of a booklet which described various way of committing suicide was not 
an offence. Criminal liability would only be found if the booklet was given to a particular 
individual who was considering suicide at that time.  
17 The Suicide Act 1961 s2 (4).  
18 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL] 2003-2004; Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill [HL] 2005-2006. 
19 Assisted Dying Bill (No1) [HL] 2015-16. 
20 Death with Dignity Act 1997. 
21 M Otlowksi, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (OUP 1997). 
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justification is a lack of capacity.22 This autonomy-based principle has often been 
conceptualised by theorists as a rights-based argument.23. Yet as Lewis highlights, rights-
claims are limited due to how these individual rights have the potential to conflict and how 
when applied, they can be indeterminate and ignore the care-based interrelatedness that exists 
between individuals.24  
With 330 votes against Lord Falconer’s Bill compared to 118 in favour, it appears unlikely 
that the issue of assisted dying will arise in Parliament for considerable time. In 2010, the 
Scottish Parliament also rejected a similar Bill. However, I argue that we are fortunate that 
The Assisted Dying Bill (No1) Bill was rejected at its first reading for three distinct reasons. 
These are the eligibility criteria; the concept of suffering, and thirdly the application of 
capacity. These reasons highlight how the individual who requests assistance has traditionally 
been perceived in the legislative environment, and highlights the theoretical arguments 
briefly discussed above.  
Terminal Illness 
The eligibility criteria of terminal illness are an important issue to raise as it restricts who 
would be eligible for assistance. The suggested “eligibility” criteria were as follows: 
 (a) a diagnosis by a registered medical practitioner as having an inevitably progressive 
condition which cannot be reversed by treatment (“a terminal illness”); and 
 (b) as a consequence of that terminal illness, is reasonably expected to die within six 
months.25 
 Firstly, these criteria would have only served a small percentage of the population and 
excludes those who live with degenerative or chronic conditions. Secondly, it has been 
demonstrated that in other jurisdictions where both palliative care and assisted dying have 
																																																						
22 ibid 188-191. 
23 See further; P Lewis, Assisted Dying and Legal Change (OUP, 2007). 
24 ibid.  
25 Assisted Dying Bill ((No1) (n19) s2.  
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been available, individuals in the last six months of their life chose to make use of palliative 
care options over an assisted death. It is understandable that the restrictive criteria of The 
Assisted Dying (No 1) Bill was a realisation that if legislation were to be passed, it would be 
premised on the strictest of criteria and that either judicial engagement or further Bills could 
have expanded the original legislation. Most importantly though, in cases that have come 
before the courts, 26  all concerned individuals living with a degenerative or chronic illness. In 
fact, the (unofficial) Commission on Assisted Dying Report27 predominantly focussed on the 
experiences of those with a degenerative illness, with this group deemed as most in need of 
assistance to end their own life.  
Unbearable Suffering – is it always up to medicine? 
Historically, in the UK, assisted dying has been perceived as inextricably linked to medical 
futility and understandings of suffering. The (unofficial) Commission on Assisted Dying and 
the Assisted Dying (No 1) Bill made a presumption that assisted dying is only appropriate 
when the individual has an ‘inevitably progressive condition which cannot be reversed by 
treatment.’28  The Commission’s inclusion of suffering reflects a transition from the 
traditional moral paradigm of the sanctity of life to the equivalently traditional moral 
paradigm of quality of life arguments.29 Proponents of the principle of the sanctity of life, 
such as Keown, argue that human life is intrinsically valuable in and of itself and as such the 
intentional termination of life is morally reprehensible.30 In contrast the principle of quality of 
life suggests that life is instrumentally valuable based on the concept that it is our experiences 
																																																						
26 See further; R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800; R (Purdy) v 
DPP [2009] UKHL 45; Nicklinson (n1).  
27 Commission on Assisted Dying 2012 
<https://www.demos.co.uk/files/476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_single-
NEW_.pdf?1328113363> accessed 13 March 2017. 
28 Assisted Dying Bill ((No1) (n19) s2.  
29 See further; J Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An argument against 
legislation (CUP 2002). 
30 ibid. 
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that shape the value found in our existence. In the proposed legislation, there was no mention 
of the wider context of the effects of terminal illness (let alone a degenerative diagnosis) and 
how this affects the individual’s quality of life.  The Bill failed to reflect the relational, social 
and financial life interests (although this list is not limited to these factors) that are 
inextricably linked to life-limiting diagnoses and quality of life assessments. Instead medical 
futility is viewed as the determining factor in choosing to die.  
By incorporating an understanding of suffering into an assessment of assisted dying 
arguments, a broader understanding of what is conducive to a (subjectively) ‘good life’ can 
be understood. As Price has argued, suffering can emanate from an entirely non-medical 
cause.31 Price also argued that this has the potential to threaten the professionalism of 
healthcare professionals as if medicine’s ability to “heal” is equal to its power to “kill” then 
the healthcare professional becomes a ‘morally neutered technician.’32 However, I argue that 
the healthcare professional’s medical role remains an important arbiter in how far suffering is 
determined to be subjective.  
Interestingly, the (unofficial) Commission on Assisted Dying Report placed great emphasis 
on the concept of the subjective experience of suffering but did not include the wide range of 
factors that influence a quality of life assessment as in the suggested legislation. In contrast, 
both the Netherlands33 and Belgium34 legislate in favour of assisted dying premised on 
criterion of individual suffering. In the Netherlands the patient's suffering must be lasting and 
unbearable. It is arguable that a diagnosis which results in unbearable suffering will 
undoubtedly have an effect on relational dynamics, life plans or goals, personal values and 
financial concerns that the dying individual holds. These examples acknowledge and 
																																																						
31 D Price, ‘What shape to euthanasia after Bland? Historical, contemporary and futuristic 
paradigms’ (2009) LQR 125.  
32 ibid. 
33 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
(Netherlands) 2002. 
34 The Euthanasia Act (Belgium) 2002 
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influence a subjective understanding of what it means to suffer. However, as the Dutch case 
of Brongensma35 illustrates, if there is no somatic or physical illness as a basis for suffering, 
existential suffering alone is not grounds for assisted suicide. Therefore, suffering is 
constrained by whether it originates from a medically classified disease. Though suffering 
may be constrained as a consequence of a medically classified disease, it does not necessarily 
mean that the broad scope of factors that influence a subjective quality of life assessment 
cannot be utilised. However, there is potential to objectively assess the concept of suffering 
premised on a medically classified disease. This argument is supported by Gevers’ empirical 
study into physician’s and patient’s views of suffering in light of requests for assistance to 
die.36 Gevers’ found that health care professionals often took a narrow view of the 
significance of the suffering and also often based this on the physical symptoms the patient 
was experiencing. As such, the non-physical suffering connected with the individual’s 
physical symptoms were not recognised.  
 This comparison briefly illustrates how the reasons behind a desire to end one’s own life 
prove to be much broader in scope than just the symptoms of a medically recognised illness. 
However, a subjective assessment of what it means to suffer will always be underpinned by 
an objective medical assessment. The objective-subjective relationship will undoubtedly 
continue to make understanding the concept of suffering complex. Yet the concept of 
unbearable suffering should not be ignored. This concept does take steps to widen the scope 
of who would be eligible for assistance but also reflects the realities of how, as individuals, 
when we are affected by illness we make decisions about the values and experiences of life 
which the previous and narrow attempts at legislation have ignored. 
  
																																																						
35 HR 24 Dec 2002 (LJN AE8772). 
36 JK Gevers, ‘Legislation on euthanasia: recent developments in The Netherlands’ (1992) J 
Med Ethics 18 (3). 
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Autonomy and capacity 
This section will discuss how we legislate in respect of individuals who would typically be 
deemed as “lacking” capacity. Lord Falconer’s Bill referred to capacity as defined by the 
Mental Capacity Act.37 Traditionally, capacity criteria for the individual who requests 
assistance has been narrowly constructed and have avoided the complexities of enabling 
autonomous decisions for individuals with intellectual or psycho-social disabilities. 
Dementia provides a pertinent example of why the consideration of autonomy is important to 
the legal frameworks concerning the individual who requests assistance. This is because 
dementia is defined as a terminal and degenerative illness and therefore would satisfy the 
criteria in Lord Falconer’s Bill. However, since a diagnosis of dementia means a progressive 
loss of capacity, this naturally raises questions about the relationship between capacity and 
assistance.38 It is unlikely that in the last six months of life, the individual living with 
dementia would satisfy the capacity requirements which have continually been emphasised as 
the cornerstone of assisted dying legislation. The only option available that the individual 
with a diagnosis of dementia has is to end their life earlier (when they have the capacity to do 
so) without assistance.  
Yet Article 12 of the UN Convention on Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides 
that everyone has the right to equal treatment before the law which is inclusive of those who 
have intellectual or psycho-social disabilities. This therefore suggests that such individuals 
have a right to support in decision-making but how far this extends to a right to an assisted 
death is uncertain.39 Indeed previous attempts at legislation have ignored the role that 
precedent autonomy could play. For example, for the patient in later stages of dementia a 
																																																						
37 Assisted Dying Bill (No 1) (n19) s12. 
38 M Annear, ‘What should we know about dementia in the 21st Century? A Delphi 
consensus study’ (2015) BMC Geriatrics 15(5). 
39 See further; E Peel and R Harding, ‘A Right to ‘dying well’ with dementia? Capacity 
‘choice’ and relationality’ Feminism & Psychology 2015 25 (1).  
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framework which would honour previous wishes (inclusive of assistance to die) could be 
developed. As Hughes argues ‘by allowing the patient to retain some degree of metaphysical 
authority, advance directives can be seen as means of preserving dignity. In this sense, they 
are a form of resistance against extreme vulnerability.’40 Nevertheless, dementia patients may 
still have the ability to express preferences and opinions, even if these differ from the wishes 
stated in the advance directive.  
Dworkin has argued in favor of upholding advance directives for patients with dementia.41 
This argument is premised on the concept that the individual living with dementia cannot 
recognise their life as a whole and therefore cannot develop what Dworkin defines as criterial 
interests; the values and life goals which shape our existence. By contrast Dworkin argues 
that the pleasures of everyday life (experiential interests), although valuable, should not be 
prioritised above criterial interests when determining whether an advance directive should be 
applied. Dworkin describes the patient with advanced dementia as, ‘ignorant of self – not as 
an amnesiac is, not simply because they cannot identify their pasts – but more fundamentally 
because they have no sense of a whole life, a past joined to a future, that could be the object 
of any evaluation or concern as a whole.'42 Therefore, to honor previous wishes (inclusive of 
a request for assistance to die) is the only way to respect the autonomy of the individual. Yet 
Dresser has argued that we should respect the current views of individual living with 
dementia. Dresser contends that in the latter stages of dementia the individual is so 
cognitively isolated from their previous autonomous self that their previous wishes (or 
																																																						
40 A Hughes, ‘No man is an island: relational autonomy and dementia’ (2013) Elder Law 
Journal (3). 
41 R Dworkin, Life's Dominion  : An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual 
Freedom (Vintage Books 1990) 201–202. 
42 ibid. 
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criterial interests) do not carry any weight.43  Although making opposing arguments, both 
Dworkin and Dresser’s positions are premised on a one-dimensional perspective of the 
individual living with dementia; the individual then and the individual now. In response to 
this, Hughes has argued that a relational approach could be applied whereby both the then 
and now are incorporated into whether an advance directive should be upheld as ‘our 
emotions and experiential interests are important manifestations of our character.44 Even 
though a dementia patient may not fully understand their situation or may not be able to place 
their feelings or preferences within the greater scheme of their lives, these views are 
reflective of the person and cannot simply be dismissed. Even if the patient has executed an 
advance directive, if the patient seems happy and free from distress, it is unlikely the family 
would encourage that the advance directive be upheld. This is particularly likely where that 
treatment is effective and minimally invasive, for example antibiotic treatment for a chest 
infection. For the carers and family members, the patient remains a mother, father, friend or 
sister, rather than simply a dementia sufferer. It is important to remember that such decisions 
have enormous impact on a person's family and friends.45 
This example also reflects the current societal response to individuals living with dementia. 
As Jaworska notes, it is unlikely that a medical practitioner would be willing to administer a 
lethal dose of medication to a patient who can seemingly take value from their current 
existence, albeit a different existence before living with the symptoms of dementia.46 
																																																						
43R Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy’ (1995) 25 
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44 E R Koppelman, ‘Dementia and Dignity: Towards a New Method of Surrogate Decision 
Making’ (2002) J Med Philos 27 (1) 75-76. 
45 A Hughes, ‘No man is an island: relational autonomy and dementia’(n113). 
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Moreover, it is difficult to determine the true condition of the patient especially when the 
patient cannot communicate their feelings. The individual living with dementia may appear 
happy but cannot communicate their distress or discomfort or equally the patient living with 
dementia may not be able to remember discomfort long enough to communicate this to their 
carer. Therefore, because of the subjective nature of living with dementia and the highly 
complex assumptions that must be made I argue that this presents too many challenges to 
apply adequately precedent autonomy even if current wishes were also taken into account. 
This section has highlighted the three major arguments which define the individual who 
requests assistance: how we conceptualise illness; suffering, and autonomy. These issues will 
be, where appropriate, raised in the following section concerning the DPP’s policy. 
3. Director of Public Prosecution’s Policy  
It was not until 2009 and the case of Purdy, 47 that the House of Lords compelled the DPP to 
publish their prosecutorial policy. The DPP published a final policy in February 2010.48 Since 
then, the DPP’s prosecutorial policy has had a vast influence on the legal status of assisted 
dying with prosecution turning on the public interest stage. In 2014, the DPP’s policy was 
updated in response to the second appeal in Nicklinson brought by the appellant known as 
Martin.49  Martin sought an order for the DPP to amend the 2010 policy so that professional 
carers would not be prosecuted for assisting the suicide of Martin. In response, the DPP 
maintained that prosecution is likely if the assister was a healthcare professional or 
professional carer with a relationship of care and amended their policy to reflect this.50 
The DPP’s Policy includes sixteen factors tending in favour of prosecution and six factors 
tending against prosecution. Reading these factors together, prosecution will be unlikely if 
the victim was over eighteen years old, had capacity (as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 
																																																						
47 Purdy (n26).  
48 Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors (n15).  
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2005), could not physically undertake the act which constituted assistance, and lastly the 
‘victim’ made a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide and clearly 
communicates this to the ‘suspect’ who is known to the ‘victim.’ Importantly, the ‘suspect’ 
must have been wholly motivated by compassion with their role deemed as ‘reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to 
commit suicide.’51 
In 2008 and in an unusual step to take, the DPP published The Decision on the Death of 
Daniel James.52 This decision provides valuable insight into the evaluation of prosecutorial 
policy and will be used in this section to critique the DPP guidelines.  
The Decision on the Death of Daniel James 
Mr James was injured in a rugby training session which resulted in a dislocation of two 
vertebrae and spinal cord compression. Mr James was diagnosed as tetraplegic and was 
paralysed from the chest down but retained mobility in his shoulders, biceps and triceps. 
Within less than a year Mr James, aged 23, had attempted suicide on three separate 
occasions. It was at this point that Mr James contacted Dignitas in Switzerland. Mr James’s 
parents and a family friend aided Mr James by means of organisation of travel arrangements 
and accompaniment to Switzerland. On 12th September 2008, accompanied by his parents, Mr 
James attended a Dignitas clinic where a doctor assisted Mr James to die.53 The DPP’s 
reasoning appeared to be motivated by three issues: satisfying that Mr James had capacity; 
the assistance provided by Mr James’s family and family friend at an evidential stage test, 
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 and the assistance provided under the public interest stage of the test. The following sections 
will draw upon these issues in an analysis of the DPP’s guidelines and the influence this has 
on current legal frameworks.  
Though the DPP guidelines make it clear that their policy does not change the current 
criminal prohibition of assisted suicide in the UK, I will argue that the factors in favour and 
against prosecution provide a very clear scenario of de facto de-criminalisation of assisting 
someone to die.  
What does assistance mean?  
The DPP state that the type of assistance tending against prosecution is ‘reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to 
commit suicide.’54 In effect, though, the DPP plays a significant role in defining the acts 
which constitute assistance.  
There is little case law to support the types of actions that fulfil the criteria for minor 
encouragement or assistance but in the DPP’s discussion of the case of Mr James, assistance 
provided by Mr James’s parents was described as ‘towards the lesser culpable end of the 
spectrum.’55 At the higher end of this spectrum the DPP placed the cases of Wallis56 and 
Hough.57 In the former, the defendant bought large quantities of aspirin and codeine, cough 
medicine and a bottle of vodka. The victim, who had struggled with drug addiction, then took 
these while the defendant sat with her. The defendant refused to call an ambulance for the 
victim and was described by the police as treating the circumstances of the death of the 
victim as a joke. In the latter case, the defendant agreed to supply a deadly number of tablets 
to an eighty-four-year-old woman who wanted to commit suicide after experiencing great 
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unhappiness and suffering due to being partially blind, deaf and suffering from arthritis. The 
defendant spent a year trying to dissuade the victim but to no avail. The victim took the drugs 
and when she fell unconscious the defendant placed a bag over the victim’s head in order to 
stop the victim breathing. In both cases the defendants were found guilty of assisting suicide 
under the Suicide Act 1961. It is clear why Wallis was found criminally liable; the defendant 
had encouraged rather than discouraged the victim’s suicide for morally reprehensible 
reasons.58 What is less clear is the moral reprehensibility of the defendant in Hough; there 
was evidently discouragement but it was found that placing a bag over the victim’s head was, 
relative to providing the means to suicide, an act which was deemed as worthy of 
prosecution.  
In the case of Mr James however, sending documentation, making payments to Dignitas in 
Switzerland, making travel arrangements and accompanying the individual on the flight was 
considered by the DPP as more than just minor acts but was not sufficient to prosecute and 
hints at de facto legalisation of “suicide tourism”. The DPP’s differentiation between 
organisational assistance (Mr James), part-physical assistance (Hough) and active 
encouragement of suicide (Wallis) legitimises assistance which is “administrative” in nature 
and perhaps best characterised as secondary assistance. Comparatively, first-hand assistance 
seems to support the physical acts as in Hough and Wallis. Consequently, it appears that 
assistance will not be prosecuted for those who can financially afford to travel abroad and 
have access to familial physical care-labour. Most of all though, the DPP’s policy prevents 
the individual from dying, assisted, at home.  
What does compassion mean? 
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Paragraph 45 (3) of the guidelines states that ‘the suspect was wholly motivated by 
compassion.’ Given that Lord Hope reasoned that the law should be read in conjunction with 
the DPP guidelines, it is arguable that the DPP’s policy has amended the 1961 Act by making 
compassion a definitional element of the offence.59 Biggs notes that ‘the existence of 
compassionate motivation has been influential in the prosecutorial decision-making process 
for some time, despite its denial in criminal law doctrine.’60 The DPP have not clarified how 
compassion is defined in this context and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
comprehensibly analyse the contributions to its meaning. 
Though the DPP’s guidelines do not stipulate that a certain medical condition must be 
present, (it was discussed in the consultation process), the policy suggests that a medical 
condition underlies the basis of compassion.61 The tenth public interest factor tending in 
favour of prosecution is that the victim was ‘physically able to undertake the act that 
constituted assistance him or herself.’ This means that in instances such as Mr James, 
individuals who suffer from degenerative or paralysing injuries are deserving of enough 
compassion to assist them to commit suicide.  The DPP described Mr James as a ‘dynamic, 
active, sporty, young man who loved travel and being independent.’62 I question that if Mr 
James had not been sporty or active but rather someone who enjoyed time indoors watching 
television whether there would have been less compassion owed because he could still enjoy 
a similar standard of activity before the accident which rendered him disabled. One can 
question that if Mr James had more mobility then the DPP would have viewed compassion as 
misplaced in this scenario. Though this factor is perhaps included to demarcate the difference 
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between assistance and the practice of active euthanasia (even if this is voluntary) I argue that 
this factor has a more profound effect on the relationship between compassion and rights 
rhetoric in legal regulation. 
As Lewis notes, the use of rights has dominated arguments concerning assisted dying.63 
Though Lewis fails to illustrate whether rights arguments have an overall benefit for 
legalising assisted dying, the discussion of rights draws parallels with Herring’s discussion of 
compassion and legal rights. Herring argues that rights operate to draw boundaries around 
individuals.64 I argue that viewing compassion as inherently linked to a physical disability 
operates to draw a rights-based boundary which presents individuals as having the right to 
self-determination and to act on this right. Not only does this categorise the type of physical 
disability appropriate for assisted dying but it also excludes individuals who suffer from 
dementia, who may be physically “fit” but are intellectually disabled. The DPP guidelines 
presume that those who have physical ability are able to end their life without help. By 
restricting the type of individual to those who are exceedingly physically disabled we 
seemingly view compassion as inextricably connected to a medical condition rather than the 
effects of that condition. By establishing a compassionate response as one justified by a 
medical condition with associated physical restrictions we run the risk that we normatively 
view physical disability as inextricably linked to suffering and the prospect of suicide. It is 
arguable that this approach encourages an incorrect societal understanding that disability is 
only physical which results in risk that disability becomes stereotyped in this way. Instead, a 
compassionate response to recognising physical restrictions must also recognise that rights 
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are also situated within relationships of care and are connected to a social, political and 
historical context.65 
Further, paragraph 45(4) states that the ‘suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from 
taking the course of action which resulted in his or her suicide.’66 Lewis describes the DPP’s 
use of reluctance as ‘some sort of conscience-driven emotional difficulty’ in providing 
assistance. Although an extremely emotional situation, it should not necessarily be presumed 
that the assister does not want the individual to end their own life. This is not to say that they 
desire the death of the individual but it is to appreciate that the assister may agree that death 
is a better alternative than to continue living. O’Sullivan perceptively describes this as 
‘hiving off cases where an accused benevolently assists another to commit suicide from those 
where an accused acted equally intentionally but was not entirely motivated by compassion. 
The latter are guilty of the offence, the former are actually or effectively exempted.’67 In the 
Decision of Mr James, the DPP described Daniel’s parents as ‘particularly distressed by his 
wish to end his own life. They tried relentlessly to persuade him to not do so.’68 The DPP’s 
policy imagines an idealised scenario, the assister does not want the individual to die but 
obliges nonetheless. I argue that agreeing with the dying individual that suicide is a more 
suitable alternative than suffering does not make compassionate assistance any less 
compassionate than trying to dissuade the dying individual to end their own life. As Herring 
argues, the law has the ability to influence societal functioning. Therefore, in agreement with 
Herring, the law’s influence should facilitate caring relationships wherever possible. 69The 
DPP’s idealised scenario which creates an obliging assister fails to protect and promote 
caring relationships which are inclusive of an assister agreeing that death may be the best 
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option. These weaknesses suggest compassion is used as a definitional element of the defence 
to gloss over value that the DPP places on autonomy.  
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Concealing autonomy  
In this section I argue that compassion is used as a mechanism by the DPP to conceal the fact 
that prosecutorial decisions concerning assisted dying are weighted heavily in favour of an 
autonomous decision. As Benders asks; ‘is freedom purely about autonomy or does it bind us 
together in a web of care, concern and obligation?’ 70 
Out of the six factors tending against prosecution, paragraph 45 (1), (4) and (5) are premised 
on the dying individual as having made an autonomous choice to commit suicide.71 As the 
evidential test for prosecution was certainly satisfied it almost appears that the public interest 
stage was formulated in a way that relates Mr James’s autonomy as a justification for why 
this appeared to be an “isolated” incident. Further to this, even though evidentiary criteria had 
been satisfied for prosecution the fact that capacity requirements were also satisfied overrides 
any form of public interest stage satisfaction. Throughout the DPP’s discussion of the public 
interest stage of the test, continual reference was made to Mr James’s capacity and ability to 
make an autonomous choice. The DPP described Daniel as a ‘fiercely independent young 
man with full capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment.’ Daniel was described 
as evaluating other care options, recognising how his current condition (and possible further 
suicide attempts) and travelling to Dignitas would affect his family. In comparison, the DPP’s 
justification for family assistance not being deemed as ‘ringleaders’ or using their ‘position of 
trust’ was underpinned by the fact that Mr James was deemed to have sufficient autonomy 
and therefore capacity to end his life with assistance. Biggs has argued that when applying 
the MCA to patients who lack capacity, taking account of the values and wishes of the 
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individual mean that compassion will be at the very core of this analysis.72 Though the DPP 
guidelines serve the individual who has capacity, a similar analogy can be made: compassion 
can be used as a tool to understand the viewpoint of the individual who requires assistance.  
This forms part of our understanding of the role of autonomy in decision-making. This would 
then make the assister’s reluctance and the attempt of dissuasion counter to the use of 
compassion as way to achieve respect for an autonomous decision on behalf of the individual 
who wishes to end their life.  
Though the DPP guidelines provide ‘limited evidence towards a compassionate basis for 
permissible legal change,’73if we are to take a compassionate understanding of autonomy as 
the basis for non-prosecution then certain evidential and safeguarding questions arise. As 
Biggs and the DPP note, it is difficult to ascertain evidence for capacity once the individual in 
question has died. Therefore, there is potential that there are insufficient safeguards to protect 
and support autonomous choice. In response to this, I argue that this highlights an 
opportunity to develop a more robust set of guidelines which explicitly outlines the reliance 
on satisfying autonomous choice rather than emphasising a narrow application of 
compassion. 
Regulating (familial) assistance  
The DPP guidelines do not characterise with clarity or certainty who can “legally” assist. For 
Coggon, this ‘formal ambiguity’ is valuable since constraint on prosecution is only attractive 
if the crime was always considered a public wrong (Coggon believes that assisted suicide is 
not always a public wrong).74 The guidelines state that an assister is likely to be prosecuted if 
they were unknown to the victim, that the suspect was motivated by the prospect of gain from 
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the death of the victim, if they gave assistance to more than one victim and that the assister 
was paid by the victim or someone close to the victim or the assister.75 This means that the 
assister who evades prosecution is likely to be an individual that falls into a neatly defined 
traditional and biogenetically linked familial paradigm. At first blush, the case of Daniel 
James and parental assistance appears as a paradigmatic example of this scenario and is 
arguably presented as this by the DPP. Yet with further investigation, specifically into the 
assistance by the family friend, what assistance means and whether a rights-claim could be 
developed is revealed. I argue that it is the lack of clarity concerning this type of assistance 
which Coggon has underestimated. Consequently, the status of the relational dynamic outside 
of these constructed familial norms remains ambiguous. 
The DPP’s decision on the Death of Daniel James focused much attention on the role of the 
Mr James’s parents as opposed to the family friend.  The DPP used the phrases ‘ringleaders’ 
and ‘organisers’76 to describe Mr James’s parents. It was argued that Daniel’s parents, despite 
taking a considerable organising role, were not ringleaders as such. This means that what 
relationship satisfies “known to the victim” is difficult to quantify. There are numerous ways 
this relationship could be defined. This relationship could be restricted to only biogenetically 
related ties. Alternatively only those who have a legally recognised relationship such as a 
marriage or civil partnership could be considered known to the victim. Despite a narrow 
construction of what would be considered a valid relationship these two examples highlight 
the different ways “known to the victim” could be defined. Further to this, outside of the 
biogenetically and legally recognised relationships are relationships which may be intimate 
but the individuals live apart. Indeed, it is questionable whether a “good friend” would also 
come within the definition of ‘known to the victim.’ What emerges from these possible 
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scenarios is that the definition of ‘known to the victim’ is broader than the one presented in 
the Decision on the Death of Daniel James. Thus the need for the DPP’s clarification of this 
is an important one, but it must also be recognised that clarification must come without 
normative definition. I argue that this could have been partially achieved if the DPP had 
accurately investigated the role of the family friend in the Daniel James’s case.  
Instead, the DPP used a discussion of ‘organisers’ and ‘ringleaders’ to gloss over the fact that 
Mr James had been assisted by the family friend. Only four lines are given over to the role of 
the family friend before the DPP concluded that their involvement was less than Mr James’s 
parents.77 Yet there was no analysis of the relationship of the family friend to Daniel. We do 
not know whether this friend was just a friend of Daniel James’s parents, how well he knew 
Daniel and how much encouragement he may or may not have provided. This is important 
because the death of Daniel James provided the DPP with an opportunity to make a 
distinction between different relational statuses and the type of assistance that would be 
“legitimate” in these instances yet they failed to do just this.  
 If the DPP made a distinction between the relational status of those who provided assistance 
there could have been scope to evaluate the relationship between each assister. I make this 
point because the level of assistance and motivation behind such assistance has the potential 
to be masked behind treating types of relational roles as the same. Thus each assister (for 
example, parents, siblings, and children) does not necessarily reflect the same relational and 
motivational dynamic in each scenario. It should not be presumed, as in the Decision on the 
Death of Daniel James, that Mr James’s parents’ role were equal in status and motivation in 
this context. Thus, within how we define who can “legally” assist, not only is the 
construction of relational status between assister and the individual who requires assistance 
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ambiguous but the relationship between assisters (if there is more than one present) also 
remains ambiguous. 
A final point to be made in this section is the exclusion of individuals who do not have family 
or family who are unwilling to provide assistance. This was just the case in the appeal made 
by Martin in Nicklinson. Typically, individuals in this situation are likely to turn to a care 
professional to ask for assistance.  
The role of the healthcare professional 
The DPP’s guidelines (influenced by Martin’s appeal in Nicklinson) make clear that 
healthcare professionals and professional carers who have responsibility for the care of the 
dying individual are at risk of being prosecuted if they assist in the suicide of someone under 
their care.78 This only applies where there is a relationship of care between the suspect and 
the victim.79 Indeed the British Medical Association warned healthcare professionals to 
essentially “shut down” any questions regarding assisted dying. The effect of this is that 
healthcare professionals are warned to unrealistically disassociate themselves with the patient 
contemplating suicide. This may result in a messy and unpleasant death both for the dying 
individual and the assister. Not only does this discriminate against those who do not have 
access to familial assistance but presents assisted dying as a practice that should only be 
carried out in the private domain. The policy is ‘designed to ensure that assistance in suicide 
remains an amateur activity carried out by inexperienced individuals.’80 
This section has discussed how the DPP’s prosecutorial guidelines concerning assisted dying 
has embellished the Suicide Act. Indeed, the DPP’s decision on the death by suicide of Mr 
James has created de facto decriminalisation of a specified scenario of assistance that is 
premised on an ambiguous definition of compassion. I have demonstrated that this definition 
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is inadequate and in fact, individual autonomy within the bounds of a specified familial 
dynamic seems to govern the DPP’s prosecutorial guidelines. By taking a care-based view to 
the DPP’s guidelines it has been illustrated that the DPP fails to acknowledge the complexity 
of the assisted dying scenario. Further, what type of relationship is necessary between assister 
and the dying individual remains ambiguous. Though some argue that we should place trust 
in the Crown Prosecution Service and DPP in investigating cases of assisted dying,81 ‘the 
opaque process of informal legal change by prosecutors’82 makes the current legal framework 
concerning assisted dying effectively untenable. 
4. Summary 
This chapter has analysed the most recent legislative attempts to legalise assisted dying. This 
analysis has critiqued the criteria established in the legislative Bills and concluded that 
terminal illness ignores those with long-term and degenerative conditions. Further, the use of 
suffering, although necessarily connected to a medical assessment reflects the subjective 
nature of quality of life arguments that are connected to the individual who requests 
assistance. This chapter also highlights the complexities of capacity and autonomy in 
regulating assisted dying. These complexities were demonstrated via a discussion of those 
living with dementia and the potential role advance directives for assistance to die could play. 
The next section focused on the influence of the DPP’s guidelines. It was argued that the de 
facto decriminalisation resulted in a narrow and weak application of compassion which 
resulted in an ambiguous understanding of relational interaction. By using the Decision on 
Daniel James, I have argued that the type of assistance and relational dynamics should have 
been more thoroughly investigated. Instead, the DPP policy has shaped the current legal 
framework of assisted dying as the de facto legalisation of suicide tourism within a narrowly 
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constructed ideal reflecting the typical focus of rights-based arguments. Any other type of 
assistance continues to remain legally ambiguous.  
CHAPTER TWO: HOW CAN AN ETHIC OF CARE APPRAOCH HELP US BETTER 
REGULATE ASSISTED DYING? 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will establish a care-based ethic which is tailored to the individual who 
requests assistance to end their life. In doing this, I will discuss each individual care actor that 
is connected to the individual who requests assistance. This will result in an evaluation of 
appropriate care-based theories required for their respective roles. The care actors involved in 
this scenario, and discussed in this chapter, include: the dying individual, family members or 
friends, the healthcare professional, the social care professional and state agencies. By 
discussing the role of each care actor, the limitations and advantages of care-based theories in 
the context of assisted dying will be evaluated. As such, this chapter will demonstrate that 
where requests for assistance to end life are made, care should be premised on positive 
private relational interaction and that this relation should be facilitated by both public and 
private systems of state support. To demonstrate this, in the following section I will briefly 
discuss the origins of a care ethic after establishing some definitional concerns concerning 
assisted dying.  
2. Defining Assisted Dying  
Vast contributions have been made to the suicide, euthanasia and assisted dying debates 
respectively. These contributions83 have often focussed on the semantic and consent-based84 
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difficulties that arise when discussing assisted dying.85In this thesis, I adopt Otlowski’s 
terminology.86 Otlowski defines euthanasia as a clinical situation where a healthcare 
professional assists a terminal or incurable patient to die or the intentional killing, often by a 
family member or friend of the dying individual for reasons of pity or mercy for the suffering 
person.87 With regard to the type of issues raised in this thesis I distinguish between passive 
euthanasia and active euthanasia. Active euthanasia is defined as a deliberate act to end an 
incurable or terminal patient’s life and bring about the patient’s death. Passive euthanasia is 
defined as the deliberate withholding or withdrawing of treatment; the object being to hasten 
the patient’s death.88  For the purposes of this chapter, “assisted dying” refers to the situation 
where one or more people help another person to end their life.89  
3. What is a care ethic?  
The term ‘care ethic’ originally derived from Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg’s theory of 
moral development.90 Kohlberg argued that the success in solving moral dilemmas was 
determined using abstract duties and principles. These principles, often referred to as justice-
based frameworks, were given a privileged status in moral decision making.91 Kohlberg went 
on to argue that females and males viewed moral dilemmas differently; males chose to use 
justice-based frameworks whereas females chose a contextualised approach to moral decision 
making. In turn, Gilligan argued that recognising interdependence in moral dilemmas and 
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then using empathy and compassion to solve such dilemmas served as an alternative 
understanding of moral development.92 Thus Gilligan established a care-ethic which relies on 
a bond of interdependence between two individuals who act responsively towards others to 
sustain caring practices.93 Gilligan then argued that removal of emotions from moral 
decision-making restricted the ability for the individual to record experience in order to 
navigate the social world successfully.94 This was demonstrated by Gilligan’s argument that 
the paradigmatic voice in judicial reasoning, such as in Roe v Wade, was of Kantian liberal 
autonomy and natural rights.95 Care ethics has therefore been placed in opposition to the 
traditional moral positon that reflects a Kantian ethic.96 Contributions to the care ethic 
literature has grown widely since Gilligan’s construction of a care-based theory of morality, 
including a substantial critique of Gilligan’s original conception. Because of Gilligan’s 
connection to familial care I will return to a critique of Gilligan’s care-based ethic in the 
discussion of family in section five. First though, in the next section I will discuss the role of 
care in application to the dying individual.  
4. The Dying Individual 
At the centre of the assisted dying debate is the individual who requests assistance to end 
their life. Typically, the dying individual has a degenerative or terminal illness which results 
in a continuing loss of quality of life. However, it is important to note that the current UK 
case law has not included appeals from those who are terminally ill, but rather those with a 
degenerative illness. Indeed, Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill97 restricted assisted dying 
to those with a terminal illness and six months to live. I make this point because the type of 
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care and experience (especially with regards to longevity) could be different between the two 
diagnoses. Therefore, when discussing the dying individual, one should not presume that 
their illness is terminal but rather it could also be degenerative over a long period. The type 
of care that the dying individual therefore requires is primarily physical and emotional. In the 
instance of a degenerative illness, often there is an increasing need for invasive care as life 
continues. It is also notable that the dying individual may also require financial support. 
Apart from being the recipient of care, the dying individual’s role is that of the decision-
maker for how their life will proceed and what type of care they wish to receive. The issues 
concerning these decisions involve a broad range of factors. These include, but are not 
limited to when, where and how they may want to proceed with their life; financial costs of 
their situation, and the impact on the relationships they have with others. The answers to 
these factors are fact-sensitive and may result in different outcomes, including a want to end 
their life. This then raises the question of how a care ethic can assist individual decision-
making.  
How can a care ethic support individual decision- making? 
I argue that a process-based view of autonomy can support the decision-making process of 
the individual who wishes to end their life. Process-based autonomy is a structural or 
procedural way of appropriate decision making, most commonly associated with Harry 
Frankfurt and Ronald Dworkin respectively.98  This differs from traditional perspectives 
which define autonomy as the ability for self-determination which is free from external 
influence.99 The type of procedural autonomy I wish to promote in this chapter is care-based 
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relational autonomy derived from Meyer100 and Friedman’s101 respective theories. I have 
chosen their versions because of the emphasis on the contextualisation of factors in the 
decision-making process.102 Because the individual’s decision to request assistance is 
inextricably linked to individual experience, process-based autonomy can form part of an 
appropriate care model to evaluate decision-making. 
Both Meyer and Friedman’s contribution to process-based autonomy literature involve a 
critical reflection, both cognitive and emotional, of the historical basis of desires and 
preferences. Meyer argues that decision making can be both a localised and immediate 
decision but also episodic, referring to larger life goals and plans.103 For Friedman, the 
outcome of the decision-making process results in absolute support for preferences or an 
absolute endorsement of preferences.104 The benefits of Friedman’s approach is that decision-
making is not just concerned with negative liberty of the freedom from external influence, 
which represents the typical autonomous paradigm, but the ability to consider a full spectrum 
of moral issues bearing upon the individual who requests assistance.  
When applied to the decisions the dying individual must make, a categorisation of immediate 
and episodic decisions is unhelpful. Planning for a life with a degenerative or terminal illness 
will, in most instances, involve decisions about the stages of experience with regards to 
quality of life. Though autonomous immediate decisions will be made day-to-day, the desire 
to end one’s own life is a decision that should be premised on an episodic consideration of 
future life plans and goals. This is because the consequence of such a decision is death, and 
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so does not fall into the same category of consequences that episodic or day-to-day decision 
making has. 
Notably though, the support/endorsement of preferences which Friedman advocates prompts 
an important discussion surrounding autonomy and assisted dying. There may be an 
expectation that the dying individual, if choosing to end their life, must have to absolutely 
endorse105 such a preference; that life and death are two opposing options, with the individual 
choosing between them. However, the use of ‘absolute support’ for preferences draws a more 
detailed understanding of autonomy and how the dying individual makes the choice about 
their future life plans. This is because ‘support for preferences’ recalibrates the decision 
surrounding choosing to die. It presents the practicalities of the dying individual’s scenario; 
that choosing to end one’s life because of a degenerative or terminal illness is a preference 
over living with the symptoms of their illness. It is not an isolated decision about the value of 
death itself. If the dying individual is forced to make decision to end their life premised on 
absolute support, there is a potential that we make a value-judgment on the value of life as 
opposed to death without considering the context and associated individual experience that 
this decision lies within. By recognising that decision-making is part of an evolving 
collection of attributes, a more comprehensive evaluation of the individual’s preferences can 
be considered. Though a subtle distinction, it is an important one – it ensures that the decision 
to end one’s life is grounded in the realities of experience.  
An issue is raised, however, when care-based procedural autonomy is applied to the dying 
individual who lacks capacity to make decisions. Typically, these patients will be in a 
persistent vegetative or minimally conscious state. In this scenario, the individual decision-
maker lacks the ability to communicate their wishes. In such scenarios, a decision is made 
after an evaluation of what is in the best interests of the dying individual. I argue that the 
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same types of factors involved in Meyer and Friedman’s respective theories can be included 
in the analysis of the dying individual’s choice. However, I also argue that the use of these 
factors are more applicable to a substituted decision, rather than deciding what is in the 
individual’s best interest. This is because there is a disparity between what might be 
objectively “good” compared to the subjectivity of the individual’s choice, if they had the 
capacity to make it. A care-based ethic should prioritise an investigation into autonomous 
choice rather than best interests.  
Thus far my discussion of procedural autonomy has been premised on an assumption that all 
relationships are positive. It presumes that caring relationships do not encourage pressure on 
the individual to end their life and that the dying individual has (or had) sufficient access to 
all available information about their condition and attached experience. Given this, as both 
Friedman and Meyer note respectively, the state must play a role in supporting decision-
making and protecting individuals from the results of decisions made by others. This will be 
discussed in an evaluation of the state’s role in section seven.  
I argue that a process-based understanding of relational autonomy recognises the realities of 
individual decision-making. This is because it grounds the dying individual’s decision in 
ending their life. The following section then, will discuss the practice of care for the 
individual who requests assistance from the perspective of family and friends.  
5. “Family”  
In immediate proximity to the dying individual are the family and friends who have a close 
personal relationship with the dying individual. The type of care provided is typically 
physical care labour, emotional support but can also include financial support. The type of 
care often associated with this scenario is premised on the maternal paradigm. In Caring,106 
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Noddings states that care is the active preservation of a connection with the one that is cared 
for, using the mother-child paradigm as a dominant example. Individuals are perceived by 
Noddings as ‘sensitive receptive and responsible agents.’107 Just as Gilligan108 and 
Ruddick109 argue, Noddings premises care as something that is natural and inherently known 
by mothers. The practice of caring then, is an ‘engrossment’ in the one who is cared for and 
therefore requires the care provider to ignore their own personal motivating values in favour 
of the care receiver.110 Noddings then categorises the practice of care through the use of 
relational circles. In the inner circle are family and friends who care because they love, 
outside that circle, the individual cares because of their situational or professional role, such 
as a teacher. Outside of this dynamic are strangers. Noddings argues that we care for 
strangers because they have the potential of coming within the two inner circles and are 
therefore owed some form of care-based recognition. 111 What can be taken from the maternal 
paradigm and Noddings’s care ethic is positive and meaningful relational interaction. I argue 
that the care provided by family and friends is reliant on the positive and meaningful 
relational interaction that Noddings describes. However, positive relational interaction cannot 
be read in isolation and Noddings, together with her fellow maternal care theorists are 
susceptible to critique.  
Firstly then, a maternal model of a care-based ethic encourages a gendered account of what it 
means to care. The use of the maternal paradigm in both Noddings and Ruddick’s work 
suggests that care is only applicable to women in the nuclear family and therefore care is 
somehow only understood and successfully practiced by women. This encourages the belief 
that women have a separate female morality. This is reflected in Gilligan’s own research, 
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which relies on a distinct difference between male and female psychological development 
and the social construction and experience of gender roles. As Green and Maccoby suggest, 
Gilligan’s sample size and characteristics of participants in Gilligan’s justificatory study are 
inadequate for drawing conclusions. Males and females do actually use care and justice-based 
frameworks equally.112 Consequently there is no necessary reason to presume that moral 
reasoning between males and females is based on inherent biological differences. In 
conceding this, Gilligan maintains that female experience is still important as it provides 
‘activities that constitute care.’113 Yet as Brabeck argues, in an attempt to suggest a different 
approach to moral decision making, Gilligan defines the traditional maternal paradigm as the 
activity that constitutes care, as a moral ideal.114 By using maternal care paradigms, care is 
considered an inherent female behaviour, not one that is learnt, and only applicable in the 
nuclear family. Gilligan’s contribution should not be used as a guiding concept for a modern-
day care ethics. Indeed, given it is clear that gender does not impact on care, ‘the importance 
of the ethics of care, and its transformatory potential, does not, and indeed must not, rest on 
the association with women.’115  
Secondly, an important point to raise in response to the individual who requests assistance, is 
the trend for maternal care theorists to romanticise the practice of care. Noddings perceives 
care to be a practice which results in a positive experience for both parties. But in reality, care 
can include negative emotions, it can be messy and it can be flawed.116 If positive experiences 
of care are seen as a normative ideal, we stigmatise those whose caring experiences do not 
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realise this ideal. Care should be viewed as a practice which is learnt, inclusive of both 
negative and positive emotions. Moreover, by moving away from the maternal paradigm of 
care, but still recognising positive relational interaction, how we care can be explored. As 
Cooper notes, caring does not have to include a deep and sustained hands-on practice, like 
that of child rearing. Care can include monetary support, the organisation of care labour itself 
plus momentary and “trivial” acts of care. For the individual who requests assistance then, 
the plurality of caring practices, not just the physical care labour that family and friends 
provide, is an important contribution to a care ethic. Though broad in her definition, Tronto’s 
care perspective illustrates just this; ‘a species of activity that includes everything we do to 
maintain, contain and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That 
world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment.’117 By recognising the scope of 
caring practices we can realise the different dimensions of care that can aid positive relational 
interaction. In realising the positive and negative experiences of familial care, the state can be 
encouraged to facilitate positive relationships by providing both public and private systems of 
support.  
At this juncture, it is appropriate to define what family and friends mean to a gender-neutral 
care-ethic. This definition has significance not only for the relationship of care in the private 
domain but also how this affects the state’s role in the facilitation of care in the public 
domain. Gilligan argues that relationships are a natural part of our existence and therefore 
necessary for the survival of society.118 Similarly, Friedman has argued that the reason we 
have certain obligations to others is because of relational interaction.119 Yet neither theorist 
justify why relationships should take a central role in moral theorising. As a naturalistic 
																																																						
117 J Tronto, Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care (Routledge 1993) 
134-136. 
118 C Gilligan, ‘Moral injury and the ethic of care: Reframing the conversation about 
differences’ (2014) Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (1).  
119 M Friedman, ‘Care and context in moral reasoning’ in Kittay et al (eds) Women and 
Moral Theory (Rowman and Littlefield 1987).  
39 
 
fallacy, they are forced to define relationships from a “natural” perspective. This perspective 
prescribes that care is only pertinent to the nuclear and biogenetically linked familial 
paradigm. 
However, I argue that care exists in a plurality of relationships, without being dependent on 
traditional nurturing roles and biogenetic ties. In her discussion of the familial institution, 
Fineman120 has not defined what constitutes “the family.” Perhaps her lack of definition is 
exactly the point, that it should not be defined for fear of constructing socially acceptable 
roles. However, in order to differentiate between the type of care required in the private 
domain and the type of care required in the public domain I will discuss what positive 
relational interaction within the setting of “family” means.  
As established above, positive relational interaction does not have to be premised on 
biogenetic ties. As Barnes notes, friendship can offer informal and reciprocal models of 
care.121 Indeed, relationships of care have typically been seen as an interaction that concerns 
only two parties, a perception which is evident in the work of maternal theorists discussed. 
However, relationships can include multiple parties, such as collective communities and 
multigenerational households.122 Interestingly, Barnes notes that care may arise from 
membership of groups, where the group was not formed for the purpose of caring.123 I argue 
that Barnes’s argument illustrates that care as both a practice and attitude is a continually 
evolving concept which is responsive to multiple environments. Thus, positive relational 
interaction does not just exist in the traditional private domain.  
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When does positive relational interaction with another (or others) become defined as familial 
care?  
I agree that “family” is chosen and premised on sentiment, emotion and material aid.124 When 
family is discussed within a care-based ethic then it should be presumed to mean the 
particular type of family we choose and are free to be ‘different in kind and composition.’125 
For the individual who requests assistance, it should not be presumed that those offering care 
are biogenetically linked or are part of traditional nuclear familial paradigms.  
Wolf argues that caring for those whom we have a personal kinship with above those who are 
strangers is morally justifiable, as relationships ‘unquestionably rank among the greatest 
goods of life’.126 Owing a heightened level of caring practice with whom the care agent is in a 
relationship forms part of that positive relational experience. Moreover, by caring for those 
who are in spatial proximity to us allows for the ability to continually exercise the practice of 
care. However, Wolf’s moderate impartialism requires that the care agent (the familial 
member in this instance) also recognises the equal respect owed to all members of that 
community. This could serve as an indication that a care ethic (broader than a discussion of 
assisted dying) requires a relational framework that prioritises caring practices between 
different relationships.   
This section has argued that in response to the individual who requests assistance to die the 
type of appropriate care which is required in the familial domain is a positive relational 
interaction, the very core of Noddings’s work. However, the type of care provided should not 
be in a maternal structure. Instead, familial care should be premised on the realities of the 
practice of care; that the result is often both positive and negative, while such practice may 
include a plurality of acts which are not necessarily sustained and meaningful. In addition, 
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though I have emphasised care in the private domain, this caring relationship should be 
premised on the choice of a particular relationship based on sentiment, emotion and material 
aid. I will draw further on this distinction when discussing the role of the healthcare 
professional in response to requests for assistance in the following section.  
6. The Healthcare Professional  
The healthcare professional is an individual that is professionally regulated who provides 
medical or health-related care. Typically, for the individual who requires assistance to end 
their life, healthcare will be provided by an inter-disciplinary team which include doctors, 
nurses, psychiatrists and occupational therapists. However, for the purpose of this chapter, 
the role of the doctor and nurse as healthcare professionals will be discussed. The type of care 
that the healthcare professional provides in this instance is one of medical diagnosis and 
management of symptoms as well as clinical responsibility for the maintenance of health and 
wellbeing of the dying individual. Inclusive of the clinical skill required to deal with the 
complex care needs of the patient, healthcare professionals also have a responsibility to 
approach their professional-patient relationship with sensitivity and understanding of the 
individual’s circumstances. Indeed, in recent years emphasis has been placed on ensuring a 
successful professional-patient relationship.127 Therefore, in consideration of the individual 
who requests assistance, the type of care and how this is framed in the professional-patient 
relationship requires analysis.  
Given that the healthcare professional is regulated by both professional and legal standards, I 
argue that the healthcare professional’s role should be premised on Tronto’s128 principled and 
consequentialist approach to care. As stated earlier in section four, Tronto defines care as, a 
‘species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain and repair our ‘world’ 
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so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves and our 
environment.’129 Though I recognise the reason Tronto uses this definition is to broaden the 
scope of care from the maternal and private paradigm, for the purpose of the healthcare 
professional’s role and the individual who requests assistance, the scope of caring activity 
needs to be constrained. The reason for this is (a) the practical ability for the healthcare 
professional to adequately care for the individual and (b) the necessity of the boundary 
between public and private types of care and relationships. Where Tronto’s principled 
approach is applied, it is only concerned with the application of clinical skill, communication 
of clinical diagnosis and possible treatment plans and supporting patients with regards to their 
healthcare choices. 
Based on this I will apply Tronto’s care ethic. Tronto’s care ethic categorises care 
fundamentally as a practice which is open to cultural variation not restricted by normative 
boundaries.130 However Tronto does offer four principles which act as dispositions. These 
principles are attentiveness, responsibility, responsiveness and competency. Attentiveness 
requires the individual to recognise the need in others to provide an appropriate response. 
This ultimately results in a propensity to become aware of need. This is similar to Tronto’s 
principle of responsibility which distinguishes responsibility from societal constructions of 
obligation. Responsibility in not defined by structures of social expectation but rather a 
flexible undertaking of caring roles. Competency requires the care giver to provide adequate 
care. Finally, responsiveness on behalf of the individual who is cared for reflects care itself: 
responsiveness expresses the vulnerability of the one who is cared for. This principled and 
consequentialist approach distances itself from the contextualised care that is endorsed by 
maternal care theorists as discussed in the previous section.  
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Tronto’s understanding of responsiveness is modelled on the concept of vulnerability. Given 
Tronto’s politically orientated care-based framework, I will argue that vulnerability can be 
defined considering Fineman’s vulnerability thesis. Fineman describes vulnerability as a 
‘present potential for each of us to become dependent based upon our persistent susceptibility 
to misfortune and catastrophe.’131 Vulnerability can either be biological or as a result of  
negative societal structures and environment the individual experiences.132 Under Tronto’s 
framework, the healthcare professional must recognise the inherent vulnerabilities that the 
individual is experiencing. I question whether this is the same as Tronto’s principle of 
attentiveness. If attentiveness is the recognition of the individual’s needs, then are these needs 
not encompassed by the concept of vulnerability? Though I recognise that Tronto’s purpose 
was to raise care to a political platform, when applied to the healthcare professional’s role – 
responsiveness and attentiveness encompass the same concept, namely to recognise the need 
of the patient. 
However, the concept of responsiveness is still an important component in the type of care 
that the healthcare professional owes to the patient. Responsiveness ensures an active 
recognition of the patient rather than their wider politico-socio impact that is described by 
Tronto. Despite the reliance on gendered norms and maternal paradigms of care, Noddings’s 
description of responsiveness is a useful contribution to the discussion of the healthcare 
professional’s framework for care. Under Noddings’s account responsiveness is a reaction on 
behalf of the care receiver to the care that is given.133 For example, for the individual who 
requires assistance to die, specifically with regard to patients in a persistent vegetative state, 
this response is inclusive of a basic embodied response. For example, the patient responds to 
being kept clean by not smelling. However, also pertinent to the individual who requests 
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assistance is the type of response required from the patient. Under Noddings’s theory (as 
discussed in section four) the concept of responsiveness portrays caring practices which are 
positive or are implicitly conducive of the desired response of the care provider. For example, 
a healthcare professional may advise a patient to continue treatment and explains that death 
may be a result of doing so. Yet the patient chooses not to take the medication. Just because 
the patient has not adhered to the advice of the healthcare provider does not mean they have 
not responded, for in acting on such advice a response has been achieved. Therefore, 
responsiveness is not a recognition of vulnerability. Instead responsiveness is a literal 
response to care provided and not necessarily one that relies on a perceived positive response 
to the care provided by the healthcare professional.  
Competency is as an integral requirement of the care ethic that is suggested for the healthcare 
professional’s role. The provision of competency recognises the obligation to ensure care is 
provided at an appropriate standard. However, for the individual who requires assistance, 
such as patients with degenerative or terminal illness, competency should not be defined as 
“curing.” Competency should instead be understood as caring for the wellbeing of the 
individual patient. This may include the alleviation of symptoms, offering alternative 
treatment plans and importantly recognising the patient’s choice to die by either refusal of 
treatment or a positive action to end life. Defining competency as recognising patient choice 
means that there needs to be a discussion about whether that choice conflicts with societal 
concerns. Therefore, the following paragraphs will discuss the political role of care while also 
looking at the positioning of the healthcare provider in the socio-political landscape.  
What type of societal model of care is appropriate? 
I suggest that a care ethic should be underpinned by communitarianism and that Tronto’s 
definition of care can be viewed as an appropriate model. 
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Communitarianism is defined as a normative theory that places emphasis on the self-
governance of communities where the individual has responsibility to the community.134 The 
traditional liberal view of communitarianism is defined as the capacity for rational self-
legislation which results in self-determined and self-governing choices. This approach 
prioritises normative identity constructs, like that of the maternal and nuclear familial 
paradigm. Instead I argue that the values endorsed by a communitarian care ethic must be 
ones which place equality of kinship, identity and care at its core. There should not be a 
distinction between identities based on constructions such as gender, sexual orientation race 
or class. This requires an explicit recognition of public interaction. I define public interaction 
as individual and state responsibility of involvement in the facilitation of and discussion of 
care in the context of community responsibility. How this achieved will be discussed in 
application to the role of the healthcare professional. 
Having already established that healthcare is premised on “care not cure,” and given that 
doctors can end a patient’s life, they can be considered as active participants in assisting an 
individual to die. Yet as Sherwin argues, often healthcare theorists have focussed on specific 
relationships in the healthcare setting, rather than taking a view of the wider structural aspects 
of care.135  
In the current healthcare setting, healthcare professionals must respect a patient’s refusal of 
treatment even if this refusal results in the death of the patient.136 Moreover, it is legal for a 
doctor to withdraw treatment from patients who lack capacity (typically because they are in a 
persistent vegetative state or minimally conscious state.)137 These two factual scenarios 
highlight the type of role the healthcare professional plays within the context of assisted 
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dying. In both scenarios, the healthcare professional participates in passive euthanasia by 
withholding and withdrawing treatment. Though in these scenarios the healthcare 
professional is not administering a lethal dose of medication and not participating in active 
euthanasia, healthcare professionals are inextricably linked to the death of the individual 
patient. 
If the type of care appropriate to the healthcare professional in this scenario is to ensure that 
the dying individual should have positive relationships in the private domain, the healthcare 
professional could have a role to play in ensuring this, which is inclusive of taking part in 
assisting the death of the individual. As the GMC states, 'good doctors make the care of their 
patients their first concern.’138 
However, I also argue that healthcare professionals have a right to object to providing care 
based on a conflict with their own beliefs. Typically, for the individual who requests such 
assistance, there are usually other healthcare professionals that care can be handed over to if 
this is the case. However, where this is not the case, I argue that the care ethic suggested in 
this chapter does not include the scope for conscientious objection. This is because this is 
premised on a consequence of good care, if objection breaks this model, competent care has 
not been achieved.  
This section has discussed the role of the healthcare professional in the context of the 
treatment and care they provide. I have argued that Tronto’s principled and consequentialist 
approach to care which recognises the individual need of the patient is the most appropriate 
framework for care. This has included an analysis of the relationship between the healthcare 
professional and their status in society and how conscientious objection is incompatible with 
the type of care suggested in this section. In building on the type of care pertinent to 
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professional bodies, the following section will discuss the role of the social care professional 
in connection to the individual who requests assistance to die.  
7. The Social Care Professional 
The social care professional is a person employed to arrange or perform personal care or 
social support for the dying individual. For the individual who requires assistance, the type of 
social care required will vary depending on the needs of the individual. Care is typically 
provided by social workers, occupational therapists, social group coordinators and personal 
care staff. For this section I will focus on the role of the personal carer. This illustrates the 
difference between types of professional social care and the provision of care in the private 
domain. The type of care that the social care professional provides is typically physical care 
labour. Their role does require professional skill (though currently not professionally 
regulated) but not clinical or medical skill. Fundamentally, the day-to-day physical care 
labour they provide replaces the physical care labour that would typically be provided by a 
family member in the private domain. The social care professional provides care that is akin 
to the care expected by the familial role. This provides an interesting dynamic for the 
appropriate type of care expected; on one hand, there is an expectation of a professional type 
of care, on the other hand, they are emulating the intimacy of care that the familial care 
provider typically delivers.  
I argue that Tronto’s principled approach is also appropriate to the social care professional’s 
role in response to the individual who requests assistance. We know that the physical care 
labour that the individual requires must be competently performed and that the social care 
professional must also be attentive to the needs of the individual. Typically, the social care 
professional will enter the individual’s home or personal life that the healthcare professional 
does not necessarily encounter (although it is appreciated that community health services do 
also do this – and this critique is perhaps pertinent to those healthcare professionals also). 
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 I argue that in the context of the social care professional’s caring role, the principle of 
responsibility should be given primacy over the other principles suggested by Tronto. Though 
it is noted that the social care professional’s relationship with the dying individual is limited 
by professional conduct, I argue that the type of relationship the social care professional has 
with the individual is more flexible. This is due to care being provided in the private home of 
the individual more so than healthcare professionals in the clinical setting. By assigning 
flexible relational conduct with the dying individual and informal or familial carer, the social 
care professional can provide competent care. 
Owing to the practice of care usually being provided in the home, the type of relationship 
between the social care professional and the individual is an important dynamic of the care 
provided. In this instance, responsibility (the relational principle of Tronto’s care ethic) 
dictates and influences how the other principles should be applied.  
Akin to the discussion of the principled approach applied to the role of the healthcare 
professional, the application of a care ethic raises the issue of whether an emotional response 
to care forms part of the social care professional’s role. This argument is raised because the 
social care professional treads between boundaries of a professional care-provider and private 
familial care provision; they replace the private care labour that was once carried out by 
familial members.  
A genuine and legitimate feeling of wanting to care for the individual draws parallels with 
Hamington’s embodied response to care.139 Hamington argues that knowledge of the care-
receiver’s need is a visceral response to what the body exhibits. I argue that an intuitive 
response to a need does not mean that the care agent chooses to care, and if they do, that the 
care is performed competently. As a King’s Fund and Nuffield Trust Report Social care for 
older people: Home truths aptly illustrates, personal care is ‘(…) an incredibly difficult job, 
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difficult profession, which doesn’t pay very well, where you’re being asked to do more and 
more on less ratios that will become less appealing.’140 In this scenario, as a description of 
Hammington’s theory illustrates, the social care professional must want to care. However, an 
alternative to Hammington’s arguments can be suggested. If paid care labour was given 
greater social and financial value, it is likely that we would encourage competent care – even 
if such care professionals did not want to care.   
This section has argued that the role of the social care professional should be premised on the 
principled approach that Tronto advocates previously discussed in section six. Importantly, 
the practice of familial-type care in the private domain must be socially and financially 
valued, and where this is not the case the social care professional must want to authentically 
care. The next section will discuss how the different types of care discussed in the above 
sections are facilitated by the state. 
8. Government Agencies  
The state dictates the status of care as a practice both in the public and private domains and 
the interrelationship between these two spheres. The type of government agencies involved in 
the care of individuals who request assistance to die will vary from the provision of health 
and social care professionals discussed above, to financial support such as personal care 
budgets. This will also extend to the police service in investigating possible assistance to 
commit suicide and the Crown Prosecution Service’s role in publishing prosecutorial 
guidelines.  
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I argue that the type of care that is appropriate to government agencies is one that is premised 
on various factors. These include but are not limited to; financial considerations, political 
ideologies, material resources and workforce resources. Therefore, a care ethic that can 
compete as a political force is required. The following paragraphs will discuss why the state 
and government agencies should facilitate a private positive relationship by providing both 
public and private systems of support.  
In Caring and the Law, Herring discusses why the practice of care matters to the state.141 
Possible arguments that are considered include economic reasons, social fairness, gender 
equality and claims from morality. Though valid, I will not discuss an argument from the 
base of gender equality, since the thesis here seeks to move beyond the maternal and 
gendered paradigm of a care-based ethic.  
Care justified on a cost-benefit analysis results in the provision of care via payment or state 
financial support (at a minimal level) and is suggested to be economically beneficial to 
society. It is argued that seeing care as an economic commodity, with state support for care in 
the private domain provides significant state financial savings. For example, Care UK argue 
that the value of unpaid care provided by informal carers in the UK totals £132 billion.142 Yet, 
it is estimated that by 2019/20 there will be a funding gap of £2 billion, which in reality 
means spending on social care of GDP will be at 0.9%. It is likely that carers will continue to 
provide informal care without the state financing the real value of the care provided.  
Despite the political arguments that are invoked by such statistics, it is evident that state 
support for a “minimum” level of care which encourages unpaid carers to continue caring is a 
cheaper alternative than funding all types of care that unpaid carers provide. It is, however, a 
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dangerous proposition that care is justified in purely monetary terms. This is because this 
model of fiscal efficiency means that the relational aspect of care is not valued. This has 
negative ramifications for the positive private relational interaction between the familial care 
provider and the individual who requests assistance. If spending on social care is likely to 
decrease, and informal care provision will make up this gap, a reasonable inference can be 
made that the increased pressure to care without state support will affect the relationship 
between the familial care provider and the dying individual. This relationship may not be 
positive but negative. 
Further to this, state funding of care poses the risk that the state has ultimate control for 
regulating care. At times this may mean removing care from the private domain, where 
qualitative output is better but fiscal efficiency is worse (and vice-versa). By supporting care 
provided by a third party, whom one can presume is paid (either formally by the state or 
through payment by the dying individual) raises the issue of care as a commodity. I argue that 
this is an important issue to raise within this chapter. A replacement of care which once 
predominantly existed in the private sphere to a commercial model changes the expected 
practices of care by professional care providers which then could have an effect on the type 
of relational dynamics that exist in the private domain.   
Alongside the commercialisation of care in the public domain there are arguments to suggest 
that paid care enables relational boundaries in the private sphere and allows for competent 
and successful provision of care.143 Indeed, Fineman has argued that payment for care allows 
care to be valued.144 However Herring has argued that care work can often be under-paid and 
as such, de-valued. In addition, care may have a market value but can also have a non-
monetary value attached to it. Thus Herring argues that payment for care should be viewed as 
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enabling care rather than valuing it.145 Though in principle Herring makes a valid point, I 
argue that in reality, monetary value has a far greater influence on the value of care objects 
and services than posited in his argument. Indeed, I argue that this has an even greater impact 
when considered in light of policies such as personal care budgets (where the individual is 
given a sum of money by the state to pay for care services in the way they deem appropriate). 
In turn, I argue that where care is discussed, market values are not applied to the practice of 
care or necessary caring skills. Instead we can value the role of care via monetary validation 
but not those caring skills that make up that role in and of itself. 
Similarly, Fineman has argued that the right to care, whether a choice or not should be 
fiscally remunerated by the state.146 This obligation is premised on the recognition of the 
value of care. Friedman’s use of rights raises the question of whether there should be a right 
to care.  
Herring distinguishes between Friedman’s model and the moral claim that care is good for 
society and should therefore be facilitated. Friedman’s justification of rights is premised on 
the concept that human beings have certain attributes which therefore promotes their status as 
rights holders. If this status-based approach is taken to justify the right to care I argue that it 
implies that there is some form of innate and natural disposition to care particular to the 
human being. The consequence of this is that we run the risk of reverting back to maternal 
and natural paradigms of care where care is seen as something known rather than learnt. This 
discriminates against those who do not “naturally” demonstrate caring qualities or force those 
who are perceived to be natural carers to undertake caring roles.   
In contrast, Herring argues that the place of care in our daily lives means that we cannot 
separate it into an identifiable right. Moreover ,Sevenhuijsen states that the practice of care 
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itself is of central moral significance.147 In agreement with Herring, “the right to care” is an 
alternative argument for care as a claim of morality. Therefore, if we are to position care as a 
right I argue that this is justified because of its instrumental value, in that protecting that right 
brings about an advantage to individuals and the community. By viewing the right to care as 
an instrumental consequence of bringing about an advantage to individuals and the 
community there is greater scope to use a care-based ethic as tool in policy making. 
Viewing care as a social good provides a way to assess whether assisted dying is an example 
of care and whether this would be supported as a community good.  
 However, as Himmelweit argues, if care is to be considered a moral or social value, this does 
not mean that the state necessarily must support it (given there are many moral and social 
values which exist, but the state does not support).148 Nevertheless, the growing costs and 
complexities of care, specifically with regards to the care of the individual who requests 
assistance, make a significant case for state responsibility for care. As Himmelweit notes,  
Not to adopt a generous strategy for caring now will shift power away from those who 
continue to care, erode caring norms, and make it more difficult to adopt a more 
caring strategy in the future. Without such a strategy, standards and availability of 
care will fall with high cost to society as a whole and fall particularly heavily on those 
who continue to care.149  
Under this analysis, the state has an obligation to facilitate the relationship between familial 
members and the dying individual by providing both positive and public systems of support 
for the practice of care. 
What type of care should the state provide? 
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Fineman suggests that societal institutions (as defined by the state) should provide the 
dependent individual with ‘resilience or resources with which to respond in specific times of 
crisis or opportunity.’150 Fineman argues that resources provide the individual with realistic 
choices which define the range of autonomous choices and acts they possess. These resources 
are categorised as human assets, physical assets, social assets, environmental assets and 
existential assets. I argue that the practice of care falls into both categories of ‘crisis’ and 
‘opportunity’ that Fineman suggests. The care required for the individual who wishes to end 
their life discussed in the above sections illustrate just this. Care can ameliorate times of 
crisis and also be viewed as an opportunity to build positive private relationships. Therefore, 
government agencies have a responsibility to recognise the caring practices that exist in 
society, inclusive of those where the individual requests assistance to die.  
As Sevenhuijsen argues, a political model of a care ethic should encourage interactive policy 
making. This means the government should be responsive supportive and organising of 
caring practices.151 Currently, the practice of care as a whole is positioned outside the centre 
of politics.152 Thus, the assisted dying debate may be at the centre of politics, yet caring for in 
the individual who requests assistance is placed outside of this political arena. State policy 
should be a progressive system which sees care taking a public role. This public role allows 
for the recognition of the unique subjectivity of individual lives, and the multiple forms and 
fragility of relationships. Although not directly related to care ethics, this draws similarities 
with Nedelsky’s critique of liberal autonomy.153 Nedelsky argues that the liberal definition of 
autonomy is a social construction. Instead we require a concept of autonomy that recognises 
our experience of embeddedness in relationships. Yet the liberal state categorises autonomy 
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as a right for the state to provide barriers which the state cannot cross or interfere with. This 
is certainly reflected in arguments in favour of assisted dying, which are often premised on 
rights-based arguments. Though Nedelsky’s theory is grounded in a critique of liberal 
property theory, I agree that care is only considered an activity when it is deemed to exist in 
the private sphere. This then presents barriers to recognising the impact that public provision 
of care has on the positive interactional relationship in the private domain. Moreover, when 
the practice of care does become present in the public domain, it is reasoned on a property-
based analysis. For example, Smart and Neale have noted that in the family courts, the 
parental role is typically defined as a right or entitlement rather than underpinned by the 
value of relational connectedness.154 For the individual who requests assistance then, the 
appropriate use of a care ethic by government agencies is to recognise the positive relational 
interaction that exists and how best they can facilitate support by various public and private 
mechanisms. 
For example, the creation and modification of policies should be inclusive of the flexibility 
for the care-giver to participate in contemporary public life but also be able to practice care in 
the private domain. For example, the care giver must be able to access employment but while 
in employment also have the ability to provide care. Indeed, Barnes has aptly described 
policy making as the ability to use the moral imagination to produce ‘care-full’155 policies 
that are inclusive of knowledge, emotional response and understanding of the issue at hand.  
Applying this to the care ethic suggested in this chapter, the state must be responsive to the 
caring roles and practices that the care-giver creates. Government agencies and state policies 
must be open to, and inclusive of, different caring practices than those traditionally caring 
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obligations promoted in the private domain.156 Having already argued earlier in this section 
that the promotion of caring relationships should be seen as a human right,157 I argue that 
policies based on a care ethic should support the relationship between private relational 
interactions. What this means in reality is that there is a multiplicity of relationships that 
should be supported by various methods of state support. As noted in section four with 
regards to care, positive relationships can be described as efficient, impersonal or superficial, 
and equally described as substantive, emotionally connected and enduring. These experiences 
of care and the relationships that derive from them are reliant on both public and private care 
provisions. Thus, as Sevenhuijsen suggests, the state’s facilitation of care is premised on the 
role of a supervisor to ensure that care is correctly attended to.158  As such, by recognising the 
plurality of relational caring goals, then healthcare professionals, social care professionals 
and government agencies have a responsibility to ensure that the type of care which they 
provide prioritises the positive relationship in the private domain. In the current political 
climate however, it is perhaps an ideal view that the state takes a supervisory approach to the 
provision of a multiplicity of caring practices in the public and private domain. Therefore, a 
minimum level of state facilitation of care needs to be discussed.  
What minimum level of state facilitation of care is appropriate?  
 In The Heart of Justice, Engster suggests six principles for care set at a minimally decent 
level as a basic response to state provision of care.159 These principles include to help 
individuals meet their basic needs for survival such as nourishment, sanitary water and 
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shelter, and to enable individuals sustain their basic capabilities for cognitive activities when 
they cannot achieve these goals on their own. In addition, Engster argues that governments 
should organise or fund programs of care by incorporating the input of those within caring 
relationships. At the same time the government should ensure that the public are aware and 
can easily access the programmes of care available. This would mean that care would be 
delivered at a local and personal level like providing support to informal carers. Finally, and 
of important significance for the individual who requests assistance, Engster includes in his 
suggested principles, ‘to help individuals to avoid and alleviate unnecessary pain and 
suffering when they need help in meeting this goal.’ 
Though I support Engster’s approach as a basic minimum for state facilitation of care, it is 
noted that this is not inclusive of a positive relational interaction. If Engster’s approach is 
promoted as a minimum level of state provision, then it must be inclusive of positive caring 
relational dynamics. Arguably this can be implicitly seen in Herring’s work. In supporting 
Engster’s basic decent minimum of care, Herring references this as the ‘state’s response to 
those in caring relationships’ rather than the state’s response to those who are vulnerable or 
are in need of care as isolated individuals. I agree with Herring’s use of a basic response to 
care which is focussed on supporting relationships as this is a community good. 
In application to assisted dying then, under Engster’s basic response, the state’s responsibility 
for the dying individual’s survival and basic cognitive abilities does seem to include the 
dying individual. The individual may receive care that ensures that they are well nourished 
and hydrated, have access to a safe and suitable residence and have support to demonstrate 
cognitive abilities, such as machines which enable communication through eye movements. 
Importantly, under Engster’s analysis, the state has a responsibility towards alleviating the 
potential pain and suffering the dying individual (and arguably those whom they are 
relationally associated with) may experience. At first blush, it seems that if assisted dying 
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alleviates the pain and suffering of the dying individual, then the state has a responsibility to 
facilitate this. However, Engster uses the phrase ‘unnecessary pain and suffering.’ I question 
how Engster defines unnecessary pain and suffering. Given that Engster’s other principles 
appear to support the continuum of life, one can argue that Engster’s approach could be 
interpreted as supporting sanctity of life principles. However, assisting the dying individual 
to die would remove the very pain and suffering which forms part of their existence. By 
prioritising life over the alleviation of suffering there is a risk that the practice of care is 
perceived as an activity that is only applicable to the maintenance of life. This could result in 
ignoring the other values that care contributes to society such as positive relationships and 
political movements.  
If the state’s responsibility for care is to be of a minimum standard of ensuring the 
maintenance of life, it must be accepted that, under this definition, care cannot be inclusive of 
a state responsibility to facilitate assistance to help the dying individual end their life. 
Arguably, then, the dying individual that wishes to end their life could experience conditions 
that may be cared for under a basic response but still experience pain and suffering due to the 
context of their condition.  
If this is the case, then one can argue that any care required above the basic level, whether 
this is physical care labour, emotional support or fiscal support will be facilitated in the 
private domain. Given the complex physical care needs of the individual who requests 
assistance and the emotional context that this may have on relationships, a reasonable 
inference can be made that such experience could have a negative effect on private positive 
relational interaction. The use of Engster’s application is suitable for a care ethic that 
supports a practical application of physical care labour, but not one that supports the choice 
to die on behalf of the dying individual. Therefore, if Engster’s basic minimum level of care 
is to be applied to the state policy and the facilitation of care in the public and private domain 
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in the context of the individual who requests assistance, it must be improved by recognising 
that the ultimate goal of care is not necessarily the maintenance of life at all costs and that the 
alleviation of pain and suffering in inclusive of the possibility of ending the life of the care 
receiver.  
I have argued that a care ethic should be premised on positive private relational interaction 
and the state’s role should be to facilitate this relationship by providing both public and 
private systems of support which ensure a positive relationship between the relevant parties. 
However, where a definition of care is reliant on the state’s role in the facilitation of private 
positive relational interaction by providing both private and public systems of support, the 
fiscal considerations of models of care requires review. 
I argue that a care-based approach by government agencies is conducive to positive 
relationships and to society itself. (Though it is noted that a balance must be struck between 
ensuring successful and competent caring relationships with appropriately financed 
facilitation of care in the public domain.) This means that a minimal level of care needs to be 
established. However in response to the individual who requests assistance to die, a basic 
minimal approach that maintains life at the cost of assisting the individual to end their life 
could jeopardise the very understanding of care. Care could be stripped of its societal value, 
relational value and the ability to recognise the complexities and nuances which arise in 
different caring relationships.  I therefore argue that state provision of care as a societal value 
as an important enabler of positive relational interaction in the private domain.  
9. Summary 
Commencing from Gilligan’s work, this chapter has discussed how different care-based 
ethics can be applied to the individual roles involved in the assisting dying scenario. I have 
argued that the role of the dying individual in making decisions about their care is reliant on a 
process-based version of autonomy. In applying Meyer and Freidman’s respective theories, I 
60 
 
have illustrated that a care orientated version of process-based autonomy emphasises the 
importance of considering the collection of attributes pertinent to the individual who requests 
assistance which are grounded in the realities of the individual’s unique experience. This 
chapter then went on to discuss why the positive relational paradigm, specifically in 
Noddings’s work, at the core of maternal care ethics, is still a valuable contribution to the 
role of care in the private and familial domain. However, it has been made clear that the 
positive relational interaction should not premised on traditional nurturing roles, the 
romaticisation of care or biogenetic links. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, family is 
defined as a relationship that is chosen, with multiple forms of caring practices which are 
based on sentiment, emotion and material aid. It is from this basis that I have defined a care 
ethic as a private positive relational interaction and that the state’s role should be to facilitate 
this relationship by providing both public and private systems of support. The different types 
of care that are appropriate for the individual who requests assistance have then been 
discussed in relation to healthcare and social care professionals respectively. I have argued 
that a principled and consequentialist approach to care, as per Tronto’s account, is suitable 
for the healthcare professional and the social care professional. However, I have questioned 
whether there is a clear difference between the principles of attentiveness and responsiveness, 
and whether they both account for understanding of the individual care receiver’s needs 
based on vulnerability. I have also argued that Tronto’s principle of responsiveness should be 
understood as a literal and embodied response to the provision of care. In addition, given the 
social care professional’s positioning in the private domain, their role should have an 
authentic desire to care which can be illustrated by Hammington’s embodied response to 
care. The final section of this chapter argues that government agencies should use a care-
based ethic as a way of generating policies which reflect care in response to the individual 
who requests assistance. Though I argue that care is morally valuable, due to fiscal 
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limitations, I have also included an analysis of Engster’s minimally decent level of care, 
though it is questionable how far this supports the state’s facilitation in assisting an individual 
to die. A care-based ethics helps us to better recognise the realities of care concerning 
requests for assistance to die. By doing this I have argued that regulation of assisted dying 
must support positive relationships in the private domain. The state has an obligation to 
facilitate these relationships by providing both public and private systems of support.  
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CHAPTER THREE: WHAT ARE THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
CONCERNING ASSISTED DYING: CONTEMPORARY MEDICAL LAW CASES 
 
1. Introduction 
In this section I will discuss three contemporary medical law cases concerning assisted dying: 
Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Aintree160, Briggs v Briggs161 and 
Nicklinson162. These cases have been selected in order to illustrate the connection between 
patients with capacity and those who lack capacity and how this informs our understanding of 
assisted dying. Aintree and Briggs will be used to analyse how the withdrawal of treatment 
from patients who lack capacity to consent is conceptualised and applied by the courts. With 
recourse to the Mental Capacity Act, the analysis of the judicial reasoning in these cases will 
focus on three primary issues concerned with withdrawal of treatment in the context of 
assisted dying; futility, the best interest test, and intending death. The Supreme Court 
decision in Nicklinson is included in this section as a way of bringing together the 
contemporary issues that surround assisting dying and how this can be compared to the legal 
frameworks concerning withdrawal of treatment. 
2. Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James: What is 
treatment and can we withdraw it? 
The law makes it clear that taking the life of another person constitutes murder.163 If the 
healthcare professional terminates the life of the patient, with the intention to bring about 
their death, no matter how compassionately, and regardless of the patient’s consent the 
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healthcare professional will be charged with murder.164 Thus, ‘“mercy killing” by active 
means is murder(…) that the doctor’s motives are kindly for some, although not for all, 
transform the moral quality of the act, but this makes no difference in the law’.165 There is 
potential then, that if the health care professional does not provide care they can be found 
criminally liable for the patient’s death. 
This issue was brought to prominence in the seminal case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.166 
Mr Bland had suffered irreversible damage to his brain due to crush injuries experienced at 
Hillsborough football stadium. Mr Bland had no cortical function but his brain stem 
continued to function warranting a diagnosis of permanent (now persistent) vegetative state 
(PVS). In 1993, the House of Lords unanimously granted a declaration that it was lawful for 
doctors to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) which would lead to Mr 
Bland’s death, with this ANH characterised as medical treatment.167  
What is important for the discussion of assisted dying is whether we define (clinically) 
artificial nutrition and hydration as a treatment or as the provision of basic care. The 
complexities of this question are emphasised when applied to patients in a MCS. Unlike 
patients in PVS, patients in a MCS are often described as occupying a twilight world. MCS 
patients have a minimal amount of awareness and communication skills and can experience 
pleasure and pain (though this is difficult to objectively measure).168 Because MCS patients 
can demonstrate behavioural evidence of self-awareness and/or awareness of the environment 
they inhabit this scenario offers a more nuanced approach than that of patients in a PVS in 
analysing the current legal framework concerning ANH.  
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There are two options: the first is that ANH is a medical treatment and therefore can be 
withdrawn legally if it is considered futile. The second option is that ANH is considered 
basic care, akin to washing a patient, which cannot be considered futile and legally 
withdrawn.169 Thus ANH could be considered as medical treatment if the insertion of the 
nasogastric tube and feeding solutions were administered and overseen by a medical 
professional. Yet nasogastric tubes for the purpose of ANH are also used within care settings 
and even familial members can be trained to administer such a therapy, whether this is in the 
private familial home or professional care setting. This means that ANH can be recast as a 
care-based practice. Keown argues that the definitional arguments concerning ANH are 
premised on the context that ANH is administered in; 
A doctor may do many things in the course of his or her practice, such as reassuring 
patients or fitting catheters, which are not distinctively medical in nature. And, if it is 
opinion which is crucial, the answer one gets may well depend on whom one asks. 
Tube-feeding may be regarded as medical treatment by many doctors, but many 
nurses regard it as ordinary care.170 
I argue that how ANH is defined is dependent on the setting that the treatment is 
administered in.171 The case of Aintree provides a pertinent example of this. In Aintree, sixty-
eight-year-old Mr James fell into a MCS after suffering complications from his cancer 
treatment. His awareness was described as very limited but was described as taking great 
enjoyment from recognising his family and close friends, often demonstrating facial 
expressions when hearing about family news or listening to music.172 The hospital treating Mr 
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James sought a declaration from the Court of Protection that if Mr James’s condition 
deteriorated, that clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) could be lawfully 
removed which would then result in Mr James’s death. This case predominantly concerned 
questions of futility which is beyond the scope of this thesis.173 This section will instead focus 
on the setting of Mr James’s care.  
Because Mr James was in a clinical hospital and the ANH was predominantly administered 
by a medical professional, ANH should be deemed as treatment. This can be compared to 
Briggs, (the facts of the case will be discussed later in this chapter). Mr Briggs was in a care 
home, not a hospital, his treatment was described as palliative in nature rather than solely 
medical. Therefore in this instance, ANH could be defined as care.174 So here we have two 
different scenarios; ANH as treatment because of the medical context and ANH as care 
because it is provided in care-based setting. 
The consequences of this is that if ANH is characterised as a treatment it will be judged by a 
different standard to that of ANH characterised as care. By withdrawing treatment the health 
care professional is not causing the death of the patient. Yet, if care is withdrawn the health 
care professional is responsible for the death of the patient and takes a step closer to 
practicing passive euthanasia. This then conflates how we view the withdrawal of treatment – 
in some instances it exists near the borders of what we deem as “assisted dying” and in other 
instances it is an example of “assisted dying”. This will be further discussed in chapter four in 
a reconceptualisation of how we determine assistance to die.  
How to determine when we should withdraw treatment 
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Without capacity to consent to the withdrawal of treatment, the decision to withdraw 
treatment from the minimally conscious patient is governed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA).175If it is deemed that the patient lacks capacity the MCA provides a framework to 
enable a substitute judgment to be made. This substitute judgment is made in consideration of 
what would be in the best interest of the individual. Alongside the best interest test, the MCA 
also provides a regulatory framework to administer advance directives and power of 
attorney.176 For the purpose of this chapter attention will be placed on the best interest test. 
 Section four of the MCA states that the decision-maker must so far as is reasonable consider;  
(a)the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant 
written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.177 
This test requires a difficult balance between a subjective and objective interpretation to be 
made. However it was made clear in the MCA’s practice notes that the best interest test did 
not constitute a substituted judgment test.178 Section five of the MCA also states that where 
the determination of best interests is concerned with life-sustaining treatment, the decision-
maker must not be motivated by the desire to bring about death.179 However the line between 
the best interest test and substituted judgment test is somewhat blurred. As Brazier notes, 
‘“best interests”’ is a phrase easy to utter and difficult to interpret. It inevitably involves 
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judgments of quality of life.’180 The following discussion of judicial reasoning illustrates just 
this. 
  
																																																						
180 M Brazier, Medicine Patients and the Law (3rd edn, Penguin Group 2003) 452-453. 
68 
 
A substituted judgment– The approach in Briggs 
Buchanan and Brock define a substituted judgment as acting according to what the individual 
who lacked capacity would choose if they did have capacity. In contrast, the best interest test 
is defined as acting to promote the optimum welfare interests for the patient in an evaluation 
of each option available. 181 The Explanatory Notes to the MCA expressly state that the best 
interest test is not a substituted judgment test. This has also been affirmed by Lady Hale in 
Aintree182and by Charles J in Briggs;183 a substituted judgment is inclusive of but not 
determinative of the best interest test. The best interest test and substituted judgment test 
differ in the weight assigned to the various interests concerned with the individual. The best 
interest test places weight (although not necessarily equal) on each interest and weighs them 
up comparatively. In contrast, a substituted judgment test takes a narrower view and places 
sole emphasises on what the individual who lacked capacity would have wanted. It is also 
important to note here that the substituted judgment test is not the same as surrogate decision-
making. This is a process by which the courts will nominate an individual to make decisions 
on behalf of the individual who lacks capacity.184  
Up until Aintree, it was typical for cases concerning the withdrawal of treatment to emphasise 
the sanctity of life.185 Yet for Lady Hale, the purpose of the best interest test was ‘to consider 
matters from the patient’s point of view’186 with emphasis placed on familial opinion.187 Lady 
Hale’s approach redefined the emphasis placed on the role of wishes and feelings in the 
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calculation of best interests. Recently, the Law Commission published their report on Mental 
Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty. The report recommends that the factors engaged in the 
best interest test should be recalibrated with particular weight attached to the wishes and 
feelings ascertained. 188 Given this, and in evaluation of subsequent case law since Aintree, 
most evidently in Briggs, I argue that a substituted judgment test has the potential to be 
increasingly deployed under the guise of the best interest test. This is evident in Charles J’s 
reasoning in Briggs.  
At paragraph [57] Charles J expressly stated that he was applying a best interest.  
‘The test is not a “what P would have done test”, it is a best 
interests test and so a test that requires the decision maker to perform a weighing or 
balancing exercise between a range of divergent and competing factors.’ 
However, it is questionable how much ‘balancing” was undertaken by Charles J. I argue that 
the use of this balancing act was a gloss on a substituted judgement, heavily reliant on 
evidence provided by Mr Briggs’s wife. This is illustrated by Charles J’s “balancing” of the 
sanctity of life against the familial evidence of Mr Briggs’s wishes and feelings. As discussed 
above, Lady Hale’s dicta in Aintree and the House of Lords judgment in Bland weakens the 
emphasis on the principle of the sanctity of life in favour of a quality of life assessment. 
Charles J’s dicta places the sanctity of life as an extreme position at one end of a spectrum 
and quality of life at the other end of the spectrum. A quality of life assessment is only used 
briefly and instead places considerable weight on the importance of respecting Mr Brigg’s 
self-determination premised on the speculative substituted judgment.  
 ‘The totality of the family evidence has convinced me in the sense that I am sure (and 
so have no reasonable doubt) that if Mr Briggs had heard the evidence and argument 
that I have, including the evidence about his best case scenario and the possible 
																																																						
188 Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty March 2017 Law Com No 
372 pages 156-161.  
70 
 
distress, pain and difficulties he and his family may face if his CANH treatment is not 
continued he would have would have decided not to give consent to the continuation 
of his CANH treatment.’189 
 Charles J discussed both evidence provided from Mr Briggs’s family, friends and colleagues 
and medical opinion. Charles J’s judgment is significant because of the emphasis that is 
placed between the two opinions. Charles J made the evidence from family, friends and 
colleagues as a significant sub-division of his reasoning. Not only did Charles J discuss the 
evidence given but also then spent a considerable amount of time justifying the weight he 
places on the familial evidence. Comparatively, Charles J considered that there is no need for 
an extended analysis of medical opinion; stating that the medical opinion discussed in the 
overview of the judgment was sufficient. Even before Charles J tried to “weigh up” these 
factors there is a clear presumption on the benefits of familial evidence of Mr Briggs’s wishes 
and feelings. Charles J’s reasoning reflects Brostrom’s et al’s arguments that a substituted 
judgment test is neither directed to be an adequacy condition for decisions or as a tool to 
understand the mind of the individual who lacks capacity.190 As Brostrom et al argue how one 
should imagine what the patient wants is a complex task.191 They have suggested that there is 
a conceptual and practical difference between the incompetent individual’s wants, values and 
what they would consent to.192 
Without this direction, there is potential that the hypothetical scenarios that a substituted 
judgment-maker is encouraged to consider are underdeveloped.  
Although Briggs was not a case that involved assisted dying, what is significant is the broad 
range of witness opinions used. This included Mr Briggs’s wife, mother, two brothers, sister-
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in-law and a police colleague. A useful comparison can be drawn with Sir Stephen Brown’s 
dicta in Bland.193 In Bland, only two familial witnesses were used; Mr Bland’s father 
provided oral evidence while Mr Bland’s mother provided a witness statement. Importantly 
as Dresser argues, ‘in this emotional, uncertain and socially complex situation, specific 
interpretations of substituted judgments are unlikely to have much impact on the surrogate’s 
choices.’194However, by having the widest spectrum of familial evidence available there is a 
greater chance that the court get a representative view of the individual and have the potential 
to minimise the effects of the emotional and complex situation presented to familial 
members.  
This can be contrasted against Pauffley J’s dicta in United Lincolnshire NHS Trust v N.195 In a 
similar set of facts to Briggs, the case concerned the continued treatment of a patient (N) in a 
MCS. Pauffley J determined that it would be lawful to discontinue treatment based on a 
single conversation N had with her friend where she said she would not want to live with 
reduced capacity. Though Pauffley J followed a balance sheet framework,196 the decision 
made was virtually determined on the evidence stating what N would have wanted. This 
demonstrates another step closer to a substituted judgment test and also raises expected 
questions concerning the reliability of evidence of what the individual would have wanted. 
For example, in a study completed by 2595 surrogate-patient pairs predicted the patients’ 
treatment preferences with a 68% accuracy rate with this rate failing to increase after the 
pairs were given the opportunity for prior discussion of treatment preferences.197 
Withdrawing or continuing treatment –intending death?  
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The removal of treatment from patients who cannot consent has often concerned whether we 
desire the death of the patient. This is significant because Lady Hale expressly reflected 
section 5(5) of the MCA; 198 that the goal of withdrawal of treatment must not, in considering 
what is the best interest of the patient, be motivated by the desire to bring about death. 
However, in Briggs,199 Charles J blurred this conceptual distinction.  
The facts of Briggs are like that of Aintree. After being injured in a road traffic collision, Mr 
Briggs suffered severe and permanent brain damage which resulted in a diagnosis of a MCS. 
At the time of the hearing, Mr Briggs was in a stable condition and was between MCS- 
(demonstrating non-reflex movements) and MCS+ (command following).200  It was argued by 
Mr Brigg’s medical team that Mr Briggs could, with a further six months of rehabilitation, be 
able to demonstrate emotion and answer rudimentary questions about his feelings. The most 
realistic best-case scenario for Mr Briggs was that he was happy, had the ability to make 
basic decisions, have both pleasurable and painful experiences, be severely physically 
disabled, require twenty-four-hour care but would be unlikely to be depressed given that he 
could not contemplate his pre-injury life and pre-injury wishes and feelings.201 Charles J 
decided that continuing CANH and the potential of extended rehabilitation was not in Mr 
Briggs’s best interest.  
At the start of his reasoning Charles J clarified that ‘[t]he test I must apply is not whether Mr 
Briggs should live or die.’ However, in application to 4(4)(a) of the best interest test, Charles 
J argued that Mr Briggs’s wishes and feelings could have been motivated by wanting to die. 
Charles J asserted that section 4(5) prohibited the central argument made by Mr Briggs’s 
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wife; that death in this circumstance is what Mr Briggs would have wanted.202 On this 
account, the court did not have a desire to bring about Mr Briggs’s death but rather analysed 
Mr Briggs’s best interest with reference to his wishes and feelings which entailed wanting to 
die. 203 Under a best interest analysis then, it is inconsistent to ignore the fact that death could 
be a valid feeling or wish that the individual who lacks capacity may have desired given 
consideration of their circumstances.  
Charles J’s approach illustrates the importance of conceptualising “intending death.” It seems 
paradoxical that we recognise that death is a valid decision for patients whom have capacity 
but will not recognise this for patients who lack capacity. Intending death can be a factor to 
be weighed within the wishes and feelings of the patient who lacks capacity. This does not 
mean that the healthcare professionals or court wish the patient to die, but rather that out of 
the options open to the patient, death is the most suitable. Should the approach in Briggs 
continue to be applied, this then goes someway in realigning the law governing withdrawal of 
treatment of those who lack capacity with those who choose to refuse treatment. Though it is 
arguable that gaining evidence to prove that the individual who lacked capacity desired death 
is challenging, this is not to say that the courts should not undertake this task. As discussed in 
the following section, evidentiary support for best interest tests can be successfully gained 
and confidently relied on by the court. 
Substituted judgment test – a wider application 
It is here where dementia and questions of capacity highlight important distinctions 
concerning the MCA, end of life care and assisted dying. Where the dementia patient lacks 
capacity but still has the ability, in some way like the MCS patient, to demonstrate 
preferences about what they wish to do in daily life raises questions about what type of 
capacity mechanisms should be deployed in the assisted dying scenario. Given this and the 
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fact that, arguably, the courts are increasingly moving towards a substituted judgment test, 
there is an added complexity to the debate between the application of a best interest test and 
substituted interest test.  
This debate is often underpinned by Dworkin’s discussion of critical and experiential 
interests.204 As discussed in chapter two, critical interests are values and beliefs which direct 
one’s own life. For example, the choice to be a vegetarian because the individual believes 
that animals are owed the same moral worth as human beings. Experiential interests are those 
interests which we enjoy instrumentally. For example eating chocolate provides pleasure and 
enjoyment but I do not believe that the consumption of chocolate is a value I hold as 
significant and formative of my life goals. So then, a substituted judgment reflects the critical 
interests.  
In application to the facts of Briggs, Mr Briggs was described as risk taker; he previously 
stated that he did not think it was appropriate for children (like his own) to visit patients in a 
state like his. Mr Briggs’s previous interests supported the contention that withdrawal of 
treatment was what he would have wanted. At first blush then, it appears that critical interests 
or prior directive choice should take priority over experiential or current values and wishes. 
However, as Dresser argues, is choice not irrelevant if one lacks the capacity to choose?205 Do 
we not have current interests in a continued life? Thus for individuals in a MCS and those 
with later-stage dementia, how we make decisions on their behalf and whether this includes 
activities that constitute assisted dying become complex. Notably, under an application of a 
substituted judgment test, there have been concerns raised about familial competency and 
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misrepresentation of the dying individual’s views.206 Studies have found that options 
concerning the end of life and conditions such as MCS were not discussed with familial 
members, and when discussed, familial members incorrectly estimated the patients’ values 
and choices. In addition, Dresser has claimed that although personal identity can be 
maintained as the same, there is no particular reason why the individual in the past would 
determine the present individual’s wishes.207 This then hints that a best interest test which 
weighs up the competing interests between critical and experiential interests is superior to 
that of a substituted judgement test. 
As Herring notes, ‘even though a person is judged to be lacking capacity and their views are 
thus no longer protected by the right of autonomy, their preferences do still count for 
something.’208 These preferences reflect section four’s ‘present wishes and feelings’ of the 
MCA. For example, Mr Briggs took some level of pleasure from interaction with family and 
care professionals. It is here, and perhaps more evidently with individuals who live with 
dementia, that current views and feelings should carry some weight in determining the 
decision at hand. Importantly, Herring appears to justify his argument from concepts of 
dignity and liberty.209 Though this chapter does not have scope to discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings of these concepts, what can be noted is that Herring’s example is premised on 
the harm caused by ignoring dignity and liberty rights.  
This is akin to Feinberg’s account of honouring past preferences for future orientated 
interests.210 Feinberg argues that patients who lack capacity still retain an interest in their 
existence and the potential circumstances of their death. Therefore, and as Dresser notes, 
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respect for patients in their former competent states demonstrates respect for past preferences. 
This then brings us to the question of how we balance current preferences with past 
preferences and ultimately how this reflects our respect for individual autonomy.  
Arguably, the fact that a substituted judgment is part of the best interest test demonstrates at 
least some trust and validity placed in the mechanism. Though there are valid apprehensions 
about familial competency and misrepresentation I argue that this is not a reason to discredit 
the value a substituted judgment test has.211 There will, of course, be occasions where 
evidence from familial members are conflicting or unclear. Indeed, the sincerity of comments 
made by individuals will require evaluation. Yet I argue this is the judiciary’s role. This 
evaluation may be challenging but it is certainly not impossible. I therefore argue that a 
balance should be struck between past preferences (i.e. a substituted judgment test) and 
current interests of the individual in question. I do not think it is necessary to apply a 
normative judgment of where weight should be applied as this defeats the purpose of 
assessing the values unique to the individual in question. Therefore, decision making on 
behalf of patients who lack capacity assessments should be inclusive of an evaluation of both 
current and prior choice. Having established that a more balanced best interest test places a 
greater and more comprehensive emphasis on a substituted judgment test, the following 
section will discuss the case of Nicklinson. This will illustrate the differences in legal 
regulation between those with capacity and without and to also highlight theoretical 
arguments that underpin the assisted dying debate.  
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3. The Case of Nicklinson: tying together arguments 
Mr Nicklinson suffered a stroke which resulted in complete paralysis save for eye movement. 
Nicklinson212 concerned the legality of the Suicide Act 1961. In the first appeal, Mr 
Nicklinson sought a declaration that the prohibition on assisted suicide was incompatible 
with his right to a private life under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention. After the 
High Court refused to grant a declaration, Mr Nicklinson refused food and water and 
subsequently died. Mr Nicklinson’s wife and a second claimant named Mr Lamb were then 
added as parties to the proceedings. In 1991, after a car accident Mr Lamb was left paralysed 
save for movement in his right hand. Like Mr Nicklinson, Mr Lamb wished to end his life. A 
final appeal, and already briefly discussed in section four was added by the claimant known 
only as ‘Martin.’ In 2008, Martin suffered a brain-stem stroke which meant that he is almost 
incapable of movement. Martin wanted clarification from the DPP that a health or social care 
professional could assist him to die. By a majority of seven to two, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal brought by Mr Nicklinson and Mr Lamb. In regard to Martin’s claim, 
the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal brought by the DPP. 
Two significant cases had come before Nicklinson. In R (Pretty) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions213 Diane Pretty was living with motor neurone disease and wished to end her 
life. In order to die she would require the assistance of her husband. She requested that her 
husband would be given a guarantee that he would not be prosecuted if he helped her to die. 
After her appeal was dismissed by the Lords the ECHR rejected her claim that a right to life 
did not include a right to choose when to die. As such, quality of life could not be interpreted 
as a right to die. In R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions 214 Debbie Purdy wanted to 
travel to Switzerland for the purpose of assisted dying due to a diagnosis of progressive 
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multiple sclerosis. In order to travel to Switzerland she would require assistance from her 
husband. Debbie Purdy petitioned the Court to require the DPP to use guidance as to when 
prosecutions would be brought in similar cases to hers. The House of Lords upheld her 
appeal and the DPP were directed to produce guidance. The significance of Nicklinson 
however, lies in the dicta of Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Wilson, Lord Kerr and Lady 
Hale. Their reasoning will be used to illustrate the issues concerning the current legal 
framework. The first issue discussed concerned the inconsistency between the law governing 
withdrawal of treatment and patients with capacity but who require physical assistance to end 
their life. 
Legal inconsistencies  
Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance and Lord Wilson were sympathetic to the circumstances of the 
appellants, recognising that the law concerning suicide was inconsistent with those who are 
unable, because of a physical disability, to end their life. Given that Parliament were debating 
the Assisted Dying (No1) Bill at the time of the appeal, Lord Neuberger refused to make a 
declaration of incompatibility due to concerns of constitutional legitimacy. Similarly, Lord 
Mance refused to make a declaration because of the appellant’s reliance on secondary (rather 
than first-hand) evidence. In their dissenting judgments Lady Hale and Lord Kerr concluded 
that issues of constitutional legitimacy would not prevent them from making a declaration of 
incompatibility and also highlighted the importance of legal inconsistencies within the 
assisted dying debate. As Lord Kerr noted,  
‘if the store put on the sanctity of life cannot justify a ban on suicide by the able-
bodied, it is difficult to see how it can justify prohibiting a physically incapable 
person from seeking assistance to bring about the end of their life.’215 
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From this position, patients with capacity who refuse treatment and those, like Mr 
Nicklinson, Mr Lamb and Martin who require assistance to end their life can be compared. 
This was emphasised by Lady Hale’s discussion of Re B (Adult Refusal of Medical 
Treatment).216 Aged forty-three, Ms B became paralysed with some use of her head and neck 
muscles. Ms B was reliant on artificial ventilation. Without this ventilation Ms B would only 
have a 1% chance of living. Ms B sought a declaration from the High Court that she had the 
capacity to refuse treatment. Dame Butler-Sloss made a declaration that Ms B did have 
capacity to consent to or refuse life sustaining treatment and awarded nominal damages. It is 
perhaps a blessing (for want of a better phrase) that Ms B was receiving life-sustaining 
treatment (artificial ventilation) which by refusal, gave her the opportunity to die without 
legal culpability of anyone else involved. Yet this is not the case for individuals like Mr 
Nicklinson, Mr Lamb and Martin. The distinction between a positive (killing) act and a 
negative act (letting die) does indeed exist, but this distinction is theoretically complex. As 
Singer argues, refusal of treatment and requests for assistance to die are shaped by two 
separate legally consistent doctrines.217 Thus the comparative outcomes of Re B and 
Nicklinson are entirely predictable. Yet it is the ethical underpinning to the two scenarios 
which rest on an uneasy moral foundation. I argue that, in the assisted dying scenario, our 
autonomy rights and the moral value we attach to the facilitation of such rights underlies this 
ethical or moral foundation.218 Lord Neuberger highlights just this, 
‘Indeed, authorising a third party to switch off a person’s life support machine, as in 
Bland or Re B (Treatment) seems to me, at least arguably, to be, in some respects, a 
more drastic interference in that person’s life and a more extreme moral step, than 
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authorising a third party to set up a lethal drug delivery system so that a person can, 
but only if he wishes, activate the system to administer a lethal drug.’219 
Singer argues that instead of taking a rule-based approach to these scenarios a 
consequentialist approach should be considered.220 Therefore, the decision to permit 
assistance for individuals like Mr Nicklinson to die should be premised on the condition or 
circumstance that would remain if permission was not granted. However, I argue that the use 
of a consequentialist ethic actually encourages normative understandings of suffering and 
living with disability. Thus what may result is an arbitrary application of legally permissible 
assistance based on an objective understanding of individual circumstances. This can be 
illustrated by Maclean’s analysis of refusal of treatment cases.221 Maclean argues that often 
where refusal of treatment is not granted it is because the judge views that individual’s life as 
still being worthwhile. Yet if this is contrasted with the reasoning in Re B what can be seen is 
the emphasis on personal autonomy. Re B lacked an in-depth analysis of personal autonomy. 
If this analysis had been taken further what could have emerged was an analysis of autonomy 
rights which provided the potential for a closer alignment between the law governing refusal 
of treatment and the law governing requests for assistance to die. These legal inconsistencies 
underpin a potential but underdeveloped argument in Nicklinson, namely, that there is a right 
to die in UK law.  
Is there a right to die?  
The House of Lords in Pretty declared that there was no right to die and that Article 8 was 
not engaged. Yet at Strasbourg, Article 8 was found to be engaged, though agreeing that the 
interference of the Suicide Act was justified under Article 8(2). This was affirmed in Purdy, 
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where the House of Lords recognised the engagement of Article 8 and ordered the DPP to 
publish guidelines to prevent an unjustified interference with Article 8(2). However, since 
Purdy, Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning assisted dying has developed further. In Hass v 
Switzerland222 and confirmed by Koch v Germany223 the court recognised that respect for 
private life under Article 8 can be interpreted as ‘an individual’s right to decide by what 
means and at what point his or her life will end.’224 It can therefore be said that under the 
Convention, there is a right to die. However, the continued Strasbourg jurisprudence has not 
viewed the state or other third parties as having a correlative right to assist. Instead, the courts 
have decided what constitutes an interference with the right on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, in Gross v Switzerland the Strasbourg court ruled that a lack of guidelines of what 
circumstances a doctor could prescribe a lethal dose to an individual not suffering from a 
terminal illness was a violation of Article 8.  
Who should assist?  
The explicit recognition of the potential role of the healthcare professional in participating in 
assisted dying raises the popular debate of whether physician-assisted suicide should be 
legalised. Due to the scope of this chapter I will not touch on this debate in depth. However, 
the consequence of the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide is an important point to 
make. If “suicide tourism” is not an option, it is likely that a family member will assist the 
dying individual to end their life. This means that if assistance mirrors the facts of Hough 
there is a potential that death will not be “pleasant.” As Mullock asks, “will there be botched 
jobs?”225  Mullock provides the case of Gillderdale as a pertinent example of this.226  
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Gillderdale’s daughter, Lyn, suffered from MS and was reliant on intimate personal care. 
Because of this, Lyn wanted to end her life. Gillderdale provided two doses of morphine 
which Lyn administered herself. Unfortunately, the dosage did not bring about Lyn’s death so 
her mother found tablets in her home, crushed these with a mortar and pestle and 
administered them through Lyn’s nasogastric tube. This did not cause Lyn to die and so 
Gillderdale had to administer two or three more morphine syringes which then caused an air 
embolism in the vein. Finally, eight more tablets were administered and Lyn died. Within 
those thirty hours Gillderdale also rang a euthanasia charity and searched the internet with 
terms relating to voluntary euthanasia and morphine overdoses. I detail the facts of this case 
to illustrate the potential types of assisted suicide that the DPP’s non-prosecutorial policy 
could yield. More recently, a ninety-five-year-old man attempted to kill his wife with a 
hammer blow to the head because she did not want to die in a care home or hospital.227 By 
making prosecution of healthcare professionals and professional carers extremely likely and 
with BMA guidance warning healthcare professionals not to engage in any type of discussion 
of assisted dying, the current legal framework is hazardous. It prevents those requiring 
assistance drawing upon medical and health care knowledge which has the potential to ensure 
a more painless and “effective” death as compared to the deaths described above.   
Protection of the vulnerable 
The most substantial concern raised in Nicklinson was the protection of the vulnerable from 
duress or pressure; the sentiment being that a blanket ban on assisted dying is the only way to 
ensure sufficient protective safeguards. As Lord Sumption suggested; 
																																																						
227 The Telegraph, ‘Man, 95, spared jail over attempted mercy killing of wife who showed 
'true love' by forgiving him’ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/man-95-spared-
jail-attempted-mercy-killing-wife-judge-said-showed/ > accessed 22 May 2017. 
83 
 
 ‘If it is lawful for a third party to encourage or assist the suicide of a person who has 
chosen death with a clear head, free of external pressures, the potential arises for him 
to encourage or assist others who are in a less good position to decide.’228 
The protection of the vulnerable is a legitimate argument for the criminalisation of assisted 
suicide. Yet I will argue in the following paragraphs, with recourse to both Lady Hale and 
Lord Kerr’s dissents, that this objection is over-emphasised. 
Theorists such as Keown have argued that legalising or decriminalising assisted dying 
practices would lead to non-voluntary euthanasia (this is where the individual is unable to 
consent typically due to capacity or age issues) or involuntary euthanasia (this is where the 
individual is able to consent but has not done so. In this instance euthanasia is practiced 
without their permission). Known as the slippery slope argument, the main contention is that 
we should not assist individuals like Mr Nicklinson because involuntary assisted dying could 
be a side-effect of such assistance. However, in the most recent empirical evidence cited from 
jurisdictions where assisted dying has been legalised,229 it has been shown that there is no 
necessary connection between increases in passive suicide (withdrawal or withholding 
treatment) to the termination of life without explicit request. Importantly, no law is infallible, 
that there may be cases which ‘slip through the net’ yet these should not be used as evidence 
to support a causal link between assisted dying and non-voluntary euthanasia.  
In addition, I argue that a complete blanket ban characterises any individual with a disability 
as automatically opposed to assist dying for the reasons discussed above. This ‘one-sided 
precautionary argument’230 fails to recognise that disability groups may oppose the 
legalisation of assisted dying but disabled individuals can think the contrary. For example, 
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75% of people with a disability who participated in the 2005 British Social Attitudes Survey 
supported legislation in favour of assisted dying.231 Notably, as mentioned earlier in this 
section, every case brought before the courts concerned disabled individuals. It was the very 
experience of living with this disability that caused them to challenge the current legal 
framework. Given that the DPP’s statistics on investigating possible prosecutions suggest 
assisted dying in happening “underground”232 a blanket ban is not the solution to 
safeguarding the vulnerable but rather an argument in favour of ensuring sufficient and robust 
regulatory mechanism which ensures the presence of capacity and autonomy.  
Biggs has suggested that additional safeguards could have been added to The Assisted Dying 
(No 1) Bill by way of a declaration made in isolation to those who have the potential to exert 
influence over the dying individual.233 I raise this point because the argument highlighted by 
Biggs misses two important realities of the effects of assisted dying. Given the statistics 
produced by the CPS (which do not illustrate patterns of undue influence) I would question 
how likely the presence of duress and undue influence is in the assisted dying scenario. In 
addition, I would argue that if influence was used that this had been a process which was 
acted out over a relatively long period of time and that a formalised isolated declaration of 
signing documents is unlikely to remedy the influence already exerted. Moreover, as 
discussed in chapter one, in the assisted dying scenario, it is not beneficial to make decisions 
in isolation away from those who care for the dying individual. A more persuasive argument 
to that of Biggs’s isolated declaratory procedure is to ensure that assisted dying remains a 
legal option amongst other equally good care options which is inclusive of the ability to 
discuss assisted dying with the relevant care-based professionals.  
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Lady Hale did not see it impracticable to create a legal framework, inclusive of safeguards 
for assisted dying. Indeed, it also appeared that Lord Neuberger, Lord Wilson and Lord 
Mance were also willing if the circumstances of the case were different to agree with Lady 
Hale and Lord Kerr’s dissent. The decision in Nicklinson then is a progression from the 
somewhat conservative approach taken in Pretty. But this progression is not much more than 
a signal that the court, in the future, could be willing to allow a limited exception to the 
prohibition on assisted suicide. It appears then that if a new case presented slightly different 
arguments to those submitted in Nicklinson a majority of five-four would have been 
produced. The case of Neil Conway had the potential to provide this opportunity. However, 
the arguments provided by Mr Conway take a narrower view than those in Nicklinson and 
replicate the failed Assisted Dying Bill. Thus, it is unlikely that if his case reaches the 
appellate courts that a declaration of incompatibility will be made.  
4. Summary  
This chapter has predominantly focussed on scenarios where patients are in a minimally 
conscious state and have used the respective judgments of Briggs v Briggs and Aintree v 
James respectively. By discussing these cases I have illustrated the disadvantages and 
advantages of a best interest test as opposed to a substituted judgment test. I have argued that 
the appropriate approach is to apply a best interest approach but only if this is inclusive of a 
comprehensive application of a substituted judgment as part of this test. By using this 
approach, a more representative decision-making process can be achieved with questions 
such as intending death being inclusive of this analysis. In this chapter I then applied this 
approach to those living with dementia who request assistance to die using an advance 
directive. I have argued that honouring an advance directive which disregards the current 
wishes and feelings of patient in later stages of dementia comes to close to the line drawn 
between active and passive euthanasia. The final part of this chapter has discussed the 
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arguments raised in Nicklinson. This discussion has incorporated the traditional conceptual 
arguments raised by the assisted dying debate. I then argued that these arguments have 
ignored how the practice of care, from professionals to family, can inform and result in a 
different understanding of vulnerability and the right to assist. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HOW CAN AN ETHIC OF CARE APPROACH RECONCEPTUALISE A 
LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ASSISTED DYING? 
1. Introduction  
This chapter will be divided by five different scenarios where an individual requires 
assistance to end their life. The first scenario discussed will be the individual who has both 
full mental and physical capacity. This scenario will be used to demonstrate the limits that a 
care-based approach takes to support claims for assistance. The second scenario discussed is 
where the individual has mental capacity but lacks the physical capacity to end their life. The 
discussion of this scenario will focus on a care-based approach to autonomy and will argue 
that this approach supports the legalisation of assisted suicide. This section will focus 
predominantly on the state’s response to care. The third scenario discussed in this chapter 
concerns the individual who lacks both mental capacity and physical capacity. The 
paradigmatic example used in this section will be the patient in a MCS. This section will 
apply a care-based perspective on how to determine whether to withdraw treatment. This will 
rely on an evaluation and comparison of both the best interest and substituted judgment test 
respectively. Building on this analysis the fifth section of this chapter will discuss whether a 
care-based approach could regulate assisted dying for patients living with dementia. The final 
section will then discuss the role of the health care professional’s assistance and also, 
ultimately, whether a care-based approach supports the claim to the right to assistance. 
2. Full physical and mental capacity – the limits of a care-based ethic? 
At this juncture where it is important to discuss the individual who has full physical and 
mental capacity as this scenario demonstrates the limits of a care-based approach in 
regulating assisted dying. Recently, there have been attempts in the Netherlands to widen 
legal frameworks concerning assisted dying. It has been suggested that new legislation should 
be introduced in order to extend assisted dying practices to those who feel they have 
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“completed life.”234 This attempted legislation is primarily aimed at those who are elderly and 
who feel that they cannot gain nor contribute anything more to life. An example of this 
scenario can be illustrated by Wijngaarden et al’s study into care at the end of life. One 
participant stated:  
Look at the condition of those old ladies in the building opposite. Gaunt and half 
dead, pointlessly driven around in a wheelchair, it is simply horrible… In my eyes, it 
has nothing to do with being human anymore. They don't even know it, they just go 
through the process, and then suddenly ‘the black car’ arrives again. It is a stage of 
life, I simply don't want to go through.235 
In this instance, the individual who has both physical and mental capacity would be entitled 
(if satisfying specific eligibility criteria) to some form of assistance to end their life, most 
likely a lethal injection. Because the individual in this scenario has the physical ability to end 
their life (obviously this is dependent on the physical health of each individual) there is a 
question concerning the moral reprehensibility of aiding an individual to die who can 
seemingly do this by themselves. Given this and having established that a care-based ethic 
would justify a regulatory framework for assisted dying premised on autonomous decision-
making it would appear logical that this justification would also be applicable to those who 
feel they have “completed life.” The issue at hand is therefore how far a care ethic would 
legitimately support assistance and whether there is a limit to the moral reprehensibility of 
acts which purport to reflect caring attitudes.  
Wijngaarden et al have argued that while the elderly value self-determination and autonomy 
they are also greatly influenced by feelings of sadness and loneliness. Those in 
Wijngaarden’s study were described as:  
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[…] driven by a strong human desire to be visible, recognized, wanted, needed, 
valued, depended upon, or attended to by others. This desire illustrates the complex 
ambiguous tension in human life that, regardless of how independent a person might 
present himself, he is at the same time, a needy, vulnerable who depends heavily on 
others.  
I argue that it is here where a care ethic approach to intersectionality is useful. If process-
based autonomy is applied in this scenario the social construction of the “elder” identity can 
be realised (seemingly that they are undervalued and often ignored as members of society). If 
these feelings are the result of a societal response to the elderly then the solution to this does 
not appear to support a regulatory framework for assisted dying but rather a relocation of care 
and relationality into the public domain.  
In response to this, and as discussed in chapter one, by incorporating a communitarian ethic 
for care and dependency I argue that assisted dying should not be legalised for those who 
have full physical and mental capacity. Instead we should facilitate good social care options. 
With this, the stigma of dependency which was often repeated in the participant’s responses 
can be broken down. As Sevenjhuisen argues236 the relocation of care into the public domain 
is beneficial for the quality of care in interpersonal relations and for the good of the society as 
a whole. Societal responsibility for care is a moral good and by placing it in the public 
domain, care can be received by more members of society. Therefore, when 
reconceptualising a framework for assisted dying, a structural perspective of the various 
relational limbs that influence the desire to end one’s life must be taken into account.  
What a care-ethic provides is an argument to why individuals feel they have a “completed 
life” and suggests that a societal model of care is required. Therefore, a care-based analysis 
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does not support regulatory framework or assistance where the individual in question has 
both physical and mental capacity and has access to good quality care options.  
Yet there will be scenarios where good quality and adequate care is not available. This then 
raises the question of whether assisted dying should be permitted when good quality care 
options do not exist or cannot be accessed. This relates to Tronto’s principles of attentiveness 
and responsibility respectively. In application of Tronto’s principled approach, being aware 
of the needs of the individual may result in an understanding of the feelings which cause an 
individual to believe they have “completed life.” This is not necessarily unhelpful to a 
discussion of the regulation of assisted dying. However, it is the correlative principle of 
responsibility which poses an issue for a regulatory framework. As discussed in chapter one, 
the principle of responsibility is distinguished from the caring obligations which have 
traditionally been associated with gendered and traditional care-based roles. Because 
responsibility is not an obligation but rather an ambiguous response to the care-recipient’s 
needs there is no negative duty (because of the restriction of the use of obligation) to prohibit 
the care-giver to partake in assisting the elderly individual to die. Therefore, if Tronto’s 
principle of responsibility was incorporated into a regulatory framework, assisting the 
individual who feels as if they have “completed life” and do not have access to good care 
options would be acceptable. Yet as Sevenhuijsen notes, care is also the object of public 
opinion. Although a care ethic could support assistance for individuals who have full mental 
and physical capacity and lack other care options, care also reflects our societal identity. 
 It also concerns care as part of a politics of needs interpretation, as a dimension of 
cultural identity and as object of taste and opinion; care as a moral perspective, as a 
form of existential ethics and as a medium for building ties and commitment.237 
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In the most recent poll238 concerning the legalisation of assisted dying, only forty-six percent 
of the sample agreed that assisted dying should be legalised for those suffering from a 
‘painful, incurable but NOT terminal illness.’ Comparatively, when considering assisted 
dying for those who were terminally ill, sixty-nine percent thought that assisted dying should 
be legalised in this instance. These statistics demonstrate that a societal response to assisted 
dying remains conservative in its eligibility criteria. I argue that if there is only a majority of 
the population in favour of assisted dying for those with a terminal illness and minority 
support for those who have a painful and incurable illness, collective societal view is that 
assisting an individual who has both physical and mental capacity (even if they lack care 
options) is morally reprehensible. As a result, I argue that there must be a negative obligation 
to not assist those where it would be morally reprehensible. In current society, it is likely that 
assisting individuals who do not have access to good care options to remedy a “completed 
life” is morally reprehensible. Such an act comes dangerously close to euthanasia practices as 
opposed to the practice of an assisted death.239  
This section has demonstrated that a care-based ethic does not extend to assistance for those 
who have both mental capacity and physical capacity. Rather the limits of a care-based 
regulatory framework rely on a communitarian reflection of a societal response to the moral 
reprehensibility of certain acts.  
3. Physical incapacity and mental capacity  
This section will discuss how to regulate assisted dying for individuals who have mental 
capacity but are unable because of a physical disability to end their own life. For reasons 
discussed in chapter two, in re-establishing a regulatory framework for assisted dying the 
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suggested criteria will not be premised solely on a terminal diagnosis. In addition, having 
established in chapter two that autonomy underpins the DPP’s guidance, in reconceptualising 
a framework for individuals like Mr Nicklinson, emphasis will be placed on a care-based 
approach to process-based autonomy.  
I argue that a framework that is underpinned by autonomy should be inclusive of Friedman’s 
model of critical reflection.  This care-based approach takes a step further than ensuring a 
‘voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide.’ By contrast, Friedman’s 
approach would require an evaluation of the cognitive, emotional, historical preferences and 
desires and relationships of the individual who requests assistance. In contrast to Biggs’s 
approach which infer that isolated decisions secure a sufficient level of autonomy I argue that 
Friedman’s process-based approach places a higher-level of emphasis on the decision-maker. 
This provides them with the opportunity to reflect appropriately on the gravity of their 
decision. I argue that an important benefit of this approach is that the decision-maker can be 
supported in working through these different values. This is not to say that this support 
determines the individual’s answer and thus “pressurises” them to either end or continue their 
life. Rather, this approach provides a framework for enabling the realities of how we make 
decisions in every-day life. These decisions are relationally informed, interdependent on 
various factors and are not normatively dictated. Moreover, by ensuring autonomy is based 
on this criterion we can avoid making decisions premised on the social construction of 
identity. This is an important as the risk of stereotyping disability has been overlooked by 
those who are concerned with increasing the vulnerability of those who are disabled. 
Friedman’s criteria could answer the concerns of these critics. Friedman’s theory requires a 
comprehensive analysis of one’s own values and identity.240 Often, we do not reflect on our 
own values which express our own intersectional identities. Thus, especially for those 
																																																						
240 M Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (n99). 
93 
 
individuals who are labelled as disabled, considering the label of “disabled” encourages a 
deeper reflection as part of the autonomy criteria. Therefore, in ensuring that an autonomous 
decision has been made the factors in Friedman’s critical reflection should be set out as a 
basic criterion.   
The question of normativity also applies to what type of experience should inform an 
autonomous decision. At first blush, it may appear that autonomous decision-making should 
be premised on episodic concerns or experiences (those that define our values and beliefs). 
However, as per the concept of unbearable suffering which has informed much discussion 
surrounding potential UK legislation I argue that a care-based approach is inclusive of 
programmatic concerns those experiences of day-to-day life. If we only premise decisions on 
deeper values and beliefs we ignore the very realities of every-day life which, arguably, is at 
the heart of those like Mr Nicklinson. Therefore, when considering the criteria that make up 
Freidman’s critical reflection, a consideration of both programmatic and episodic experiences 
should be given equal evaluative weight.  
The result of a process-based version of decision-making results in a higher standard of 
autonomy but with this, is the ability to support decision-making and therefore reflect the 
realities and benefits of the decision-making process. Despite this, safeguards are still 
required to stabilise the suggested criteria which will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Safeguarding the vulnerable 
In Nicklinson, judicial reasoning focussed substantially on protecting the vulnerable. As 
discussed in chapter three, the vulnerable were described as those who were a burden on their 
care providers and those who felt pressured to end their life. Specifically, the elderly and the 
disabled were categorised in this light. Lord Kerr and Lady Hale noted that this line of 
argument actually ignores the vulnerability of individuals who are disabled but require 
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assistance to end their life. I argue that creating regulatory safeguards in response to the 
concept of vulnerability requires an appropriate understanding of what vulnerability means 
and how it can be managed. This understanding requires a wider perspective of how different 
areas of assisted dying regulation are interconnected to vulnerability.  
As discussed in chapter one, vulnerability can be caused by either biological or societal 
sources of misfortune or catastrophe. For the purpose of assisted dying I draw on Dodds’s 
discussion of dependency, care and vulnerability as this reflects the regulatory safeguards in 
response to the risk of a pressurised death. 241 Dodds’s argues that ignoring the causes of 
context specific vulnerability (situational vulnerability) which derives from social, political, 
economic, or environmental factors engenders what is known as pathogenic vulnerability. 
Pathogenic vulnerability are those vulnerabilities, as a sub-set of situational vulnerability 
which should have been eradicated by society. In turn, Dodds’s argues that often, pathogenic 
vulnerability arises out of public policy which draws on an ideal of autonomy. This ideal 
cannot be achieved by those who are deemed to be situationally vulnerable and as such 
remain dependent on care. For example Mr Nicklinson could only end his life through 
starvation. These individuals cannot achieve the level of autonomy that legal frameworks and 
state policy deem appropriate. These individuals are reliant on care and become increasingly 
vulnerable. 
Dodds’s offers a solution to this issue by suggesting that we recognise the value of relational 
autonomy developed through interpersonal and social relationships. Indeed, this illustrates 
the benefits that Meyer and Friedman’s respective process-based approaches to autonomy 
offer in respect to regulating assisted dying. This highlights two responses to the arguments 
concerning vulnerability and safeguards. Firstly, I argue that dependency on another 
individual for care does not necessarily mean they are vulnerable. The relational dynamic that 
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exists could support the autonomy of individuals like Mr Nicklinson. Secondly, though some 
biological vulnerabilities do exist I argue that these easily become situational if not 
pathogenic because of how the state facilitates care. If the state does not take responsibility 
for care and dependency then an inference can be made that there is a heightened sense of 
vulnerability because the care-based options (either provided directly by the state or 
facilitated by the state) are unavailable. 
 For example, the inability to discuss assisted dying as an end of life option with health and 
social care professionals heightens the vulnerability of specific groups such as the elderly or 
disabled. By including this discussion in a regulatory framework, we do not gloss over the 
realities of the individual who requests assistance. This discussion can ensure that the 
individual understands what an assisted death means and can compare this to other care 
options. Without this support, the individual could be vulnerable to pressure from others and 
misinformation. Therefore, when we define vulnerability as a precursor to how we provide 
appropriate regulatory safeguards it is important to recognise that it is not just the physical or 
age-related conditions of individuals that determine what vulnerability is. Rather, an 
understanding of vulnerability is inextricably linked to societal influence and response to the 
individual who requests assistance. The benefits of a care-based approach in this instance is 
that it looks at the structural emphasis on vulnerabilities rather than what is often over-
emphasised in assisted dying arguments as the one-on-one “burden.”  
Building on the above discussion, safeguarding the vulnerable is often associated with the 
concept of slippery slopes. As previously discussed in chapter three both the logical and 
empirical arguments do offer a standard by which assisted dying practices could be 
measured. However, what a care-ethic does is highlight another value by which a slippery 
slope could be measured. This is the availability and access to quality care in the jurisdiction 
where the individual who requests assistance lives. Thus when we assess the seriousness of 
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vulnerabilities and the likelihood that these would engender pressure on the individual 
regulation must also look to how social care policy and care-labour policies affect 
vulnerability. There is then scope to compare these policies within euthanasia practices in 
other jurisdictions to model a regulatory safeguard which turns on how (a lack of) care can 
affect the discussion of safeguarding of those who are vulnerable.  
This section has highlighted the inextricable link between how we can use the concept of care 
to respond to vulnerability and how this affects the application of appropriate safeguards. 
Indeed, I have argued that a care-based approach to process-based autonomy supports a legal 
framework which establishes a critical reflection of both programmatic and episodic 
experiences and values. I argue that this approach applies a high threshold for autonomous 
decision-making but also allows the individual in this scenario to be supported through this 
decision-making process in reflection of every-day decision-making.  
4. The individual who lacks both mental capacity and physical capacity  
The scenario discussed in this section reflects the individual who is in a MCS, like the 
experiences of Mr Briggs and Mr James already discussed in this thesis. This section will 
therefore focus on a care ethic response in determining whether treatment should be 
withdrawn. Although traditionally, withdrawal of treatment has not been defined as assisting 
an individual to die, I argue that withdrawal does come within the definition of assisted dying 
and therefore should be discussed in light of this. Therefore, a substituted judgment or a best 
interest test will be compared and evaluated utilising the contributions made to the care-based 
literature.  
Substituted judgment test 
As discussed previously in this thesis, a substituted judgment test seeks to establish what the 
individual who lacks capacity would have wanted. With Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (UN CRPD) advocating a substituted judgment 
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test and with increasing case law emphasising its use within a best interest test it is important 
that an evaluation of this test from a care-based approach is undertaken. A substituted 
judgment approach then typically relies on sourcing this information from family and friends 
who are presumed to know the wishes and feelings of the individual in question. This draws 
parallels with Tronto’s principled care-based approach which is focussed on being attentive 
to the needs of the individual. This is because Tronto’s theory emphasises a care-based 
response to the specific need of the individual in question. As Walker has stated, the cared for 
and the carer’s stories intersect and become a story of dialogue rather than an abstract system 
of obligations.242 This is also supported by Noddings’s care-based approach which argues that 
we should be ‘responsive to the individual’s needs.’243 Thus, like Tronto’s principle of 
responsibility, it appears that those who care for or are in caring relationships with the 
individual who lacks capacity could provide an understanding of what the individual would 
have wanted. On this understanding then, care is defined as responding to the needs of the 
individual rather than what would be in their best interests. In applying a care-based approach 
to the withdrawal of treatment I argue that a substituted judgment would be made. Building 
on this (and as discussed in previous chapters), whether a substituted judgment made by 
carers (typically family and friends in this instance) is accurate has been questioned widely. 
Therefore, a discussion about who is the appropriate person to make a substituted judgment is 
required.  
What relationship means you can make a substituted judgment test?  
Under a gendered care-based approach it would appear that those who are entitled to make a 
substituted judgment are members of nuclear and biogenetically-linked families. Typically, 
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this approach has been reflected in the best interest approaches taken by the courts.244 
However, applying Weston’s definition of family broadens the scope of which individuals 
should be included in making a substituted judgment. If family is defined as providing 
sentiment, emotional support and financial aid a wider spectrum of relationships can be 
included. The benefits of this approach means that not only does the law reflect the plurality 
of relationships that exist in society but by gaining views from a wider group of individuals it 
is likely that a more representative view of what the individual would have wanted will be 
achieved.  
Substituted judgments made by other than just the family 
Having established that a care-based reconceptualisation of family can enhance a substituted 
judgment there still remains an issue of whether a substituted judgment test should include 
relationships which fall outside the family bracket. This was exactly the case in Briggs. 
Although emphasis was placed on Mr Briggs wife’s views his wider family, friends and 
colleagues had also provided evidence. From a care-based perspective then, a question must 
be asked of what type of care-based relationship constitutes the ability to submit evidence 
under a substituted judgment test. Cooper’s investigation245 into the practices of care provides 
an interesting application to the substituted judgment. As care does not have to be deep and 
meaningful but rather it can be superficial or short-term, this provides an additional 
underdeveloped layer to the substituted judgment test. For example, the individual who had a 
conversation with the individual previous to having been in a MCS on his train commute to 
work every day is considered as practicing care. It is likely that we would not know how 
much this practice of care meant to the individual in MCS. This then raises the question of 
whether that “commuting friendship” should be considered as contributing to a substituted 
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judgment test. Equally, the individual in MCS may have friends who he regularly meets with 
but would not necessarily believe they could determine what the individual would have 
wanted. In comparison, the individual in MCS may have friends who he communicates rarely 
with but nonetheless their friendship is one that means he would trust them to make a 
substituted judgment on his behalf. I argue that Cooper’s stress on considering the plurality of 
caring practices and relationships illustrates a major disadvantage of the substituted judgment 
test. This is because if a substituted judgment is going to be accurate it must reflect the views 
of those beyond familial relationships. Yet when we seek to use the relationships outside of 
the family what is found is a plurality of relationships where care is practiced in different 
ways. How these relationships are quantified and applied in a substituted judgment scenario 
is difficult to conceptualise. Pragmatically, a true reflection of the relational dynamics 
connected the individual who lacks capacity is at the very least, difficult to achieve. 
However, a relational care-based approach could alleviate the issues raised here.  
Traditionally, where relational dynamics have come before the courts, a property rights 
entitlement has often been applied. As Nedelsky notes, instead of focussing on establishing or 
maintaining positive relational interaction, the courts have seen familial ties as an entitlement 
to a relationship. This highlights the importance of analysing the individual who lacks 
capacity’s everyday life dynamic through relational interaction. By using this as a tool within 
the substituted judgment test we could potentially view the different formal and informal, 
public and private structures and relationships that inform what that individual would have 
wanted. As Nedelsky has argues: 
Intimate relations, such as spousal relationships, are shaped by societal structures of 
relationship such as those formally shaped by family law as well as powerful norms 
of gender roles. These structures will be shaped by patterns of economic relationships, 
such as employers’ preference for hiring men in high paying jobs, expectations that 
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authority should be exercised by men over women, and governmental policies that 
ensure the availability of (overwhelmingly female) child care workers from abroad 
who will accept low pay. The availability of such workers arises from long-standing 
relations of global economic inequality. Each set of relations is nested in the next, and 
all interact with each other. Relational selves shape and are shaped by all 
interactions.246 
From this relational perspective, I argue that a substituted judgment test which evaluates the 
value of relationships provide an important contribution to understanding what the individual 
would have wanted. This approach reflects the different formal and informal, political, 
economic and other influencing factors which can determine the type of relationship and 
practice of care that exist in our social networks.  
However, as discussed previously in this thesis, much criticism of the substituted judgment 
test is the potential risk that those providing evidence get it wrong. This could potentially 
lead to the unintended death of the individual or equally the continuation of life which would 
not be wanted. However, I argue that no law or legal mechanism is infallible and as such a 
substituted judgment test should not be ignored on this basis. Instead, I argue that an 
acknowledgment that a substituted judgment may produce an “incorrect” result is important 
and that a baseline of allowance for incorrect judgments must be set.  
I argue that a care-based approach to a substituted judgment must place relationality at its 
core. Without doing so there is a risk that we rely on traditional relationships, which could be 
negative Yet by using the potential multiple relationships that exist in the individual’s life a 
substituted judgment test can be used to reflect a more representative view of what the 
individual would have wanted. 
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The best interest test 
 
As discussed previously in this thesis, the best interest test is informed by both an objective 
and subjective analysis of competing interests to support the welfare of the individual who 
lacks both mental and physical capacity. The best interest test therefore is inclusive of a 
substituted judgment. In recent years though it has been argued that this should take a 
majority emphasis it is still not definitive of the outcome of a best interest test. Therefore the 
discussion concerning substituted judgment test is also applicable to an overall analysis of the 
best interest test. The following paragraphs will first discuss a care-based approach to the best 
interest principle.  
I argue that the best interest principle is typically perceived as continuing, in a somewhat 
similar light to the substituted judgment, to focus on the individual who lacks capacity. In 
applying a care-based ethic to the best interest test there are two different approaches to take. 
If the best interest test is understood as attempting to achieve the optimum welfare interest, 
then a traditional care-based ethic would be applied. It is here where there is a risk where a 
maternal-based care-ethic could be applied. For example, Noddings’s ‘engrossment’ in the 
individual who lacks capacity is over-involved. This is because of the role the care-provider 
has. They become over-responsible for the interest of the individual, which they deem as 
best. On the other hand, if Tronto’s principled approach is applied to a best interest test, one 
can easily revert back to a substituted judgment focus. The principles of attentiveness and 
responsibility respectively are both subjectively interpreted by the care-provider. Therefore, a 
care-based application to the best interest test is not necessarily an easy fit and has the 
potential to take two extremes rather than achieve the purpose of the balance required. 
However, where a care-ethic is helpful to a reconceptualisation of the best interest test is the 
relational qualities that exist within care-based ethics. I argue that by focussing on the 
practice of care the different depths of relational caring practices we can understand the 
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embodied individual who is (potentially) influenced by the interpersonal and structural 
contexts that shape their everyday life. This contextual relationship understood from the 
practice of care establishes a balance between a maternal model of care ethic and a focus on 
the responsiveness of the individual who lacks capacity. These relational qualities can be 
applied to all those care actors who contribute to a best interest test.  
Often in the withdrawal of treatment scenario the health care professional is involved in 
contributing to what is in the best interest of the individual who lacks capacity. This 
contribution is also equally applicable to the social care professional and any other individual 
who has an interest in the individual who lack capacity’s welfare. Therefore, under a care-
based understanding for the care professional (either health of social) it is the relationship 
that dictates what information is required to inform a best interest analysis.  
In this instance, as established in chapter one, the patient-professional relationship should be 
regulated by Tronto’s care-based principled approach. I argue that Tronto’s principle of 
competency takes an important precedent and should limit the input of the health care 
professional. Though in the withdrawal of treatment scenarios the health care professional 
may have provided treatment over a long period of time this does not satisfy the health care 
professional offering more than their professional opinion only. Their relationship is one 
which is defined by professional relational boundaries and as such this means their 
knowledge of what is in the best interest of the individual who lacks capacity is strictly 
limited to their professional knowledge.  
An interesting relational dynamic in the best interest scenario is that of the social care 
professional. Typically, in the withdrawal of treatment scenario, the social care professional 
will provide daily care to the patient in a MCS often in a hospice or care home. Because a 
diagnosis of a MCS means that the patient has the potential to interact with others or the 
environment around them, the social care professional could be said to have a deeper level of 
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understanding of the patient than just providing or assessing the required “treatment.” This 
claim is obviously dependent on the spectrum of interaction and communication that the 
patient in a MCS demonstrates. Given that this interaction will involve displays of emotion 
from the individual who lacks capacity it raises the question of whether the care professional 
has the obligation to discuss the interaction and communications of the patient who lacks 
capacity despite having a professional relationship of care. This occurred in W v M [An Adult 
Patient].247 Though Baker J placed an emphasis on the preservation of life, his use of the 
social carer’s opinion was important to a care-based analysis.  
Carers with extended and recent experience of the patient will thus be better equipped 
at interpreting that behaviour. In this case, in contrast with the family members, 
nearly all of the care staff at the nursing home who were called to give evidence have 
had extensive and recent experience of M’s behaviour. Accordingly, and having heard 
them in the witness box, I find that I can give considerable weight to their evidence as 
to M’s behaviour, fortified by the fact that these interpretations have been 
substantially corroborated by the formal assessments carried out using the SMART 
and WHIM processes.248 
I argue that under a care-based analysis, Tronto’s principled approach should still be applied 
but caution must be taken that when the individual in a MCS demonstrates feelings of 
enjoyment or unhappiness that this is a perceived understanding of the individual’s wishes 
and feelings. Importantly, this understanding must only derive from the professional 
interaction that the carer has with the patient in MCS. Interestingly a comparison can be 
made to the social care professionals’ role when caring for an individual in PVS. The 
individual in PVS will not respond to their environment in any way and as such the health 
and social care professional’s role is their view to the care they administer. Thus, although 
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caring for an individual in PVS or MCS may be distressing for the health and social 
professional respectively, their professional role outweighs any emotional context that may 
inform a best interest analysis.  
Thus far this section has discussed a best interest analysis solely from the perspective of the 
patient who lacks capacity. As section 4(c) of the MCA states, the best interest test is 
required to take into account any other factors that would be likely to influence the decision 
of the individual who lacked capacity.249 Though it may be appear unusual to suggest a 
different perspective, a care-based analysis offers insight into the other factors that may well 
support a best interest analysis apart from a direct focus on the individual who lacks capacity. 
 
Building on the relational context that the substituted judgment test and best interest test 
respectively rely upon it is arguable that these very relationships can be a determining factor 
in the best interest test. For example, in Bland, the Lords’ reasoning reflected the emotional 
context of living with a brother and child who was in PVS and a ‘living death.’ For Mr 
Bland’s family, his physical existence placed a barrier to grieve appropriately for the “loss” 
of their family member. Though the decision in Bland was before the introduction of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 the recognition of the relational contexts that existed and the 
effects of Mr Bland’s PVS had on these relationships was apparent. I argue that this was also 
reflected in Briggs where Charles J recognised the impact of Briggs’s condition on his 
family, namely his young child. In the evidence submitted, it was stated that Mr Briggs had 
previously wished that if he were in the position that had befallen him that he would not want 
his child to visit him. Mr Briggs felt it was inappropriate for children to see adults in such a 
condition. It is here where using a relational paradigm, such as those suggested by 
																																																						
249MCA.  
105 
 
Nedelsky250 that the relational nature of every day decision making can be investigated. This 
approach reflects the centrality of care and support that these relationships are part of. By 
making best interest decisions which are inclusive of the possibility of prioritising those who 
have a relationship with the individual who lacks capacity we achieve the very purpose of the 
best interest test. The purpose being that the impact on our relationships with other 
individuals can be a reflection of how we make decisions in everyday life, and thus must 
reflect the decision of whether to withdraw treatment from individuals who lack capacity 
also.  
Should we consider death as an option?  
The best interest test is firmly grounded by the presumption of the preservation of life,251 and 
as such the question of whether either a substituted judgment or a best interest test 
respectively should view death as an option rather than a consequence is an important issue to 
raise. As I have argued in the previous chapter this is demonstrated by Charles J’s reasoning 
in Briggs, 
On that approach and analysis, the court would not be taking into account a desire to 
bring about Mr Briggs’ death albeit that if he had capacity so could determine what 
treatment he had, as a matter of law, he could be motivated by a desire to die or 
express himself in that way, and he may well not have analysed the issue by reference 
to that question and the doctrine of double effect.252 
In an analysis of Noddings’s care-based ethic there is nothing to suggest that her ethic of care 
would support the option of choosing death. It appears that Noddings’s emphasis on the 
contextualised circumstance of caring ignores the relationship between care and reflecting an 
autonomous choice to end life. A theory that is premised on traditional caring paradigms is 
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one that is likely to preserve life at all costs rather than seek to understand the needs of the 
individual. This is where Tronto’s approach appeals to the modern-day dilemmas of 
withdrawal of treatment issues. Tronto’s principle of attentiveness points to being responsive 
to the individual’s need. If this need is that the individual would want to die, which is 
inclusive of the withdrawal of treatment process, then under Tronto’s principled approach the 
option of choosing death would be supported. 
However, as Sevenhuijsen has argued, care can be relocated onto the public stage and can be 
used as a democratic process. Therefore, when we discuss whether to include death within an 
analysis of the withdrawal of treatment an understanding of what this means for a societal 
response to care is important. The practice of care in the private domain can integrate with 
public agency and reflect taste, opinion and cultural identity connected to the practice of care. 
Thus, in the context of the withdrawal of treatment, using the concept of care in both the 
public and private domain we can view choosing death as both a private decision on behalf of 
the individual who lacks capacity, and also how such decisions are a reflection of societal 
values and attitudes.  
In reconceptualising a regulatory framework for individuals who lack both physical and 
mental capacity I argue that a best interest test should be utilised above solely using a 
substituted judgment. This is because the use of a substituted judgment does, in comparison 
to a best interest test, have serious issues with the ability to achieve an accurate and reliable 
understanding of what the individual would have wanted. A best interest test can be inclusive 
of the effects on those who are in caring relationships with the individual who lacks capacity. 
Yet this does not mean that the substituted judgment test as part of the best interest test 
should be ignored. I argue that the substituted judgment test should broaden the scope of 
relational contributions but the type of information provided should reflect the relational 
dynamic related in that context. The best interest test provides the necessary checks and 
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balances that a substituted judgment lacks and includes a wide range of evidential sources. 
Thus, in a reconceptualisation of determining when to withdraw treatment I argue that a best 
interest analysis should be taken. Yet this is with the understanding of how relationships and 
the practice of care can influence both the informal and formal structures that determine the 
views of others and what would be in the best interest of the individual who lacks capacity.  
5. Can we assist dementia patients to die?  
Having established how to regulate assisted dying for the individual who lacks mental and 
physical capacity there is scope to apply this framework to the complex scenario that 
surrounds individuals who have been diagnosed with dementia. This analysis evaluates two 
different dementia scenarios. The first scenario is of the patient who exhibits symptoms of 
dementia, typically a loss of capacity, but when they had capacity they wished that when they 
reached such as stage they wanted their life to end. In response to this scenario, what would 
be required is some form of advance directive. Currently, the MCA does include advance 
directives but these are not for the purpose of requesting assistance to die via active means. 
The second scenario is where the individual is living with the later stages of dementia and 
because of this are more likely to experience physical illnesses such as bed sores or 
pneumonia. In this instance, often, treatment will be withdrawn or do not resuscitate orders 
will be put in place. This is not to say that the treatment would be futile but that this provides 
an “opportunity” to prevent the continuing experience of living with dementia.  
In response to the first scenario and what appears to be an advance directive is a care-based 
understanding of process-based autonomy. Process-based autonomy has been discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis. However, for the purpose of the individual who is living with 
dementia, emphasis must be placed on the contextualisation of experience which is stressed 
by a care ethic. I argue that the transition of care ethics from a maternal and traditional model 
to a political model has maintained an emphasis on the unique context of the scenario at 
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hand, with the ability to be flexible in response to the practice of care. Although process-
based autonomy may support an advance directive that regulates assisted dying for the 
individual that lives with dementia, I argue that a care-based ethic also focuses on the current 
experiences of the individual living with the symptoms of dementia. This means that the 
current scenario in which care is practiced also directs decision-making. Indeed, there is 
nothing in Tronto’s care ethic which suggests that the principle of attentiveness prioritises 
previous wishes and feelings above current wishes and feelings. In turn, I argue that a care-
based ethic, in line with the emphasis on the unique context of individual circumstances, 
would focus on the current needs, wishes and feelings of the individual who is living with 
dementia. Therefore an autonomous precedent request for assistance to die prior to a loss of 
capacity could not be regulated by a care-based legal framework. However, where the patient 
who is living with dementia is perceived to be suffering (for example her dementia causes 
him or her to demonstrate unhappy emotions) there is scope to consider assistance to die from 
a care-based perspective. 
If the principle of attentiveness (and equally Noddings’s principle of responsiveness) is 
applied to the individual who is living with negative symptoms of dementia these principles 
could be used to determine the individual’s want to end their life. In this scenario, a lethal 
injection may be given to the individual in order to end their life. However, despite an 
“unhappy” existence or experience of suffering it is questionable whether we should assist an 
individual to die. Arguably, as this chapter has demonstrated, a care-based ethic would 
support assistance for those individuals who do have capacity but lack the physical ability to 
end their lives themselves. Therefore, one could argue that the recognition of suffering which 
cannot be ameliorated also supports assistance for those suffering with the symptoms of 
dementia. Yet I argue that this comes very close to the practice of active euthanasia; that 
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without capacity and still with some physical ability assisting this individual to die remains 
morally reprehensible.  
In contrast, the withdrawal of treatment from a patient due to the physical symptoms caused 
by dementia demonstrates the moral distinction between the above scenario and the practice 
of active euthanasia and assistance conceptualised as withdrawing treatment. In these 
scenarios I argue that the withdrawal of treatment is less morally reprehensible than 
administering a lethal dose of medication for the purpose of ending the individual’s own life. 
The practice of passive euthanasia in this scenario does highlight a difference between 
societal responses to the practice of care. As noted in chapter three, I argue that the 
withdrawal of treatment (whether this is deemed as care or treatment) is permissible for 
individuals living with dementia. This is not because, by contrast, active euthanasia is 
perceived to be causing death but passive euthanasia (or the withdrawal of treatment) is 
perceived as letting the individual die: rather it is premised on how we conceptualise active 
euthanasia in response to the practice of care in our current society. By using a care ethic to 
solve this dilemma we can apply a care ethic to the social policy that surrounds assisted dying 
regulation.253 As Sevenhuijsen has argued, care is the object of taste, opinion and cultural 
identity and therefore the practice and regulation of care will always reflect this societal 
response. 
In current society then, I argue that public opinion still believes there is a marked difference 
in the moral reprehensibility between active and passive euthanasia. Such attitudes shape our 
response to what practices therefore determine care. As such, whether or not there is a logical 
distinction between active or passive euthanasia, if active euthanasia is distasteful to society’s 
understanding of care it does come within a reconceptualised regulatory framework. Thus if 
we are to take care as a democratic practice which reflects the regulation of assisted dying it 
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will also reflect public opinion on the practice of care – despite this possibly leading to 
illogical regulatory principles. Having established the dementia’s place in the assisted dying 
context, it is also important to discuss how a care-based ethic would reconceptualise the role 
of the health care professional in administering assistance.  
6. Regulating Assistance – The role of the healthcare professional 
The role of the care professional is important for two preliminary reasons. Firstly, the health 
care professional has the appropriate knowledge and skills to ensure that an assisted death is 
safe and as painless as possible. As discussed in chapter two, the case of Kay Gillderdale 
provides a pertinent example of the consequences when there is a lack of professional 
guidance in response to the individual who requests assistance to end their life.254 Secondly, it 
is likely that, for the individual who requests assistance, the decision to end one’s life is the 
result of a condition which involves the care of a health care professional. This is not to say 
that the health or social care professional must be present but it is important that the 
individual who requests assistance is inclusive of the provision of advice and expertise on 
assisted dying. 
Is discussing assisted dying assistance?  
I question whether the care professional is providing competent care if they are prevented 
from discussing the option of assisted dying and as such this leads to the question of whether 
a “discussion” of assisted dying can be determined as assistance. The consequences of 
shutting down any discussion concerning assisted dying, the healthcare professional fails to 
take a full account of the individual’s experiences and desires. The result of this is that the 
healthy professional-patient relationship is potentially eroded because of the “elephant in the 
room” that cannot be openly and freely discussed. It is important to note, however, the 
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difference between discussion and advice. I would argue that discussion is a dialogue 
between individuals where an exchange or expression of feelings and thoughts are given. In 
contrast, I argue that advice is defined as specific guidance. In application to the individual 
who requests assistance, I argue that discussing that the individual in question would want to 
end their life is not assistance if this discussion did not concern advice about how to end 
one’s own life. This approach differs from the BMA’s guidance on “shutting down” 
questions as though the health care professional is likely to note the illegality of assisted 
dying, and therefore the reasons behind such a choice and the context it exists in is important 
to discuss with regard to patient wellbeing. 
Moreover, I argue that the inability to discuss assisted dying as an end of life option with 
health and social care professionals heightens the vulnerability of specific groups such as the 
elderly or disabled. By including this discussion in a regulatory framework we do not gloss 
over the realities of individual experience. This discussion can ensure that the individual 
understands what an assisted death means and can compare this to other care options. 
Without this support, the individual could be vulnerable to pressure from others and rely on 
inaccurate information. Therefore, when we define vulnerability as a precursor to how we 
provide appropriate regulatory safeguards it is important to recognise that it is not just the 
physical or age-related conditions of individuals that determine what vulnerability is. I argue 
that this reflects Dodds’s definition of situational responsibility as the health care 
professional is part of a societal response to vulnerability. If an understanding of vulnerability 
is inextricably linked to societal influence and response to the individual who requests 
assistance then the health care professional has a responsibility to reduce the situational 
vulnerabilities associated with the individual who requests assistance.  
Therefore, at a very minimum, assisted dying regulation must include a framework which 
allows health and social care professionals to discuss an assisted death as part of how the 
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individual in question contemplates their values and wishes. Building on this, I argue that 
assistance provided by the health care professional is qualified by the facilitation of how to 
end one’s own life will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
What type of assistance – prescription or lethal dose?  
Discussions regarding the type of assistance offered by the healthcare professional has often 
concerned a doctor administering a lethal dose of medication to the dying individual.255 
However, the type of assistance that the health and social care professional can provide is 
variable. For example, assistance does not necessarily have to be an “immediate” lethal dose 
of medication administered at a specialised clinic for the very purpose of assisted dying. 
Instead care professionals can facilitate assistance in a variety of ways. For example, as is the 
case in the US state of Oregon, the healthcare professional can provide assistance by 
providing a prescription of a lethal dose of medication. This is kept by the dying individual 
for a time when they feel it is necessary to end their life.256 Or indeed a social care 
professional can provide assistance by providing physical and emotional care labour when 
travelling to a clinic or in the preparation for an assisted death. Though one must make a 
distinction between medical care and social care pertinent to each role, these brief examples 
highlights that a regulatory framework for assisted dying must reflect the multiple ways 
assistance can be provided by the health and social care professional.  
Importantly, in arguing that the care professional should provide assistance for assisted dying 
as part of a regulatory framework raises the issue of conscientious objection. Conscientious 
objection is defined as opting out of providing a particular type of care practice because of 
the individual’s personal beliefs and values (as long as these values do not result in direct 
discrimination of the individual you are treating).257  By regulating the health and social care 
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professional’s role in this way, assisted dying is perceived like any other care option at the 
end of life rather than an act which is deemed as an elevated practice of care. Therefore, I 
suggest that assistance should be provided by a health and/or social care professional. 
However, by requiring the provision of assistance of health and social care professionals 
there is the potential for health and social care professionals to use their position to endanger 
vulnerable individuals. This potential risk is heightened by the killings of at least 215 patients 
by Harold Shipman who was a registered doctor and carried out these murders via his role as 
a General Practitioner.258 This then led to an extensive enquiry led by Dame Janet Smith 
which highlighted the regulatory flaws surrounding GMC standards, availability of drugs and 
the role of the coroner. Therefore, when we consider the provision of assistance by the health 
care provider we must include the necessary regulatory safeguards to ensure that health care 
professionals act within the bounds of their professional and legal conduct.  
It is therefore pertinent to discuss whether requiring health care professionals to provide 
assistance to end the individual’s life changes the role of the health care professional 
conceptually. Typically, health care professionals, not least doctors, were seen as gatekeepers 
to good health or care.259 However, if medical diagnosis is not part of a valid criterion for an 
assisted dying framework this suggests that health care professionals are facilitators. I argue 
that the benefit of this approach is that death is not over-medicalised and inextricably linked 
to medical diagnosis or symptoms but rather grounded in the realities influencing the decision 
to end one’s own life. The consequences of this for health care providers is two-fold. Firstly, 
this may deter if not alter the reasoning of those who enter into the healthcare profession and 
secondly, the issue of conscientious objection also arises. In a similar light to Tronto’s 
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principle of responsibility, I argue that a care-based approach reflects the flexibility in how 
we respond to legitimate requests for assistance. In response to the first point highlighted, I 
argue that a regulatory framework which requires health care professionals to facilitate 
assisted dying could operate, like in other jurisdictions such as Switzerland, in separate 
clinics or with dedicated practitioners whose role is solely connected to assist dying. This 
means that the model of healthcare provision can be separated from ensuring continued 
quality of life. Secondly, I argue that if assistance provided by health care professionals is 
somewhat separated from a general healthcare model it is not beyond a reconceptualisation of 
regulation to incorporate an allowance for conscientious objection. This section has argued 
that the health care professional should provide assistance because of their knowledge and 
expertise and because they also are inevitably part of the individual’s experiences. This is not 
to say that health care professionals are forced to assist but that a new model of assistance 
could be established within a framework which is separate from the traditional model of 
health care provision. Having established who should assist the following section will discuss 
whether a care-based ethic establishes a right to assistance.  
7. Is there a right to assistance?  
The DPP’s policy states that professional carers will be prosecuted if they assist in the death 
of another. This illustrates that the right to assistance exists only in the private domain. 
Currently then, this right seems to point towards assisting suicide in another jurisdiction akin 
to the case of Daniel James. In this scenario, the assistance provided to help is 
overwhelmingly characterised as an emotionally influenced practice of care with this practice 
only existing in the private domain.  
Under this analysis one can argue that there is a right to assistance formulated as either a 
liberty right or a right to non-interference and has also been considered as welfare right. 
However, applying a care-based analysis I argue that a liberty right or right to non-
115 
 
interference does not incorporate a full account of process-based autonomy. This is because it 
ignores both the relational aspects that are part of autonomous decision-making and the 
importance of autonomy within the public rather than private domains. I therefore argue that 
a care-based approach supports a welfare-based understanding concerning the right to 
assistance. A welfare-based approach is most commonly associated with Ronald Dworkin 
and draws parallels with Article 3 of the ECHR. Yet arguments based on a welfare approach 
aptly illustrate why assistance would not be considered a right under a care-based 
perspective. This is because underpinning each rights-based justification is a status-based 
approach. As discussed in chapter one, if a right is justified by a status-based approach it 
suggests that there is something innate and natural about the human being to which the right 
is attached to. Though this may support maternal paradigms of care-based ethics as discussed 
throughout this thesis, the importance of a non-normative identity framework concerning care 
is integral if it is to be used on a legal and political platform. Instead, by justifying assistance 
as instrumentally valuable, a right can be established. Therefore under a care-based analysis 
assistance is only justified as a right if it reflects the different layers of interpersonal 
relationships and is supportive of quality care and positive interpersonal private relationships. 
As such, a right to assistance is only morally valuable because it supports the practice of care.  
Under this analysis, the state has an obligation to facilitate the positive interactional 
relationship. 
8. Summary 
This chapter has built on the discussions developed in previous chapters in this thesis and has 
created a regulatory framework concerning three paradigmatic scenarios concerning assisted 
dying. The first section has argued that the individual who has mental capacity but lacks 
physical capacity should be entitled to assistance to end their life. This is justified by a care-
based understanding of process-based autonomy deriving from Meyer and Friedman’s 
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respective theories. I then argued that this produces a higher standard of autonomy than has 
been suggested in previous legislative bills. Included in this section was a discussion of 
vulnerability and how a situational and pathogenic approach can establish a better 
understanding of the structural influence on vulnerability care and assistance. Using this 
analysis, it was also demonstrated how vulnerability can supplement a slippery slope analysis 
as a regulatory tool. From this positon a comparison was made to the scenario where the 
individual who has both physical and mental capacity but wishes to end their life. In 
response, a care-based application would not support this request for assistance. In turn, I 
argued that a care-based ethic would focus on the societal and structural issues that influence 
the want to end their life. Therefore, the limits of a care-ethic appear to be premised on a 
response to suffering. The second part of this chapter then focussed on the final individual 
who requests assistance, where the individual lacks physical and mental capacity. The 
outcome of this analysis then focussed on a comparative analysis between a substituted 
judgement and best interest test. The discussion of a substituted judgement defined the 
relational contribution and reliance on relational dynamics and demonstrated how a 
substituted judgement test, although having its merits, must be used with caution due to its 
reliance on familial evidence. In contrast, I have argued that a best interest test offers an 
important safeguard against a substituted judgement and offers the ability to make decisions 
concerning assisted dying from other perspectives such as relational dynamics. This chapter 
also included a discussion of how intending death should be an option in this analysis. From 
this, how to frame the role of the health care professional in providing assistance has also 
been established. This then led to a discussion concerning a right to assistance, arguing that 
this is underpinned by an instrumental goal of private positive relational interaction.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has identified the key care-based dimensions concerned with individuals who 
request assistance to end their life. In the first chapter, this thesis turned to an analysis of the 
current regulatory frameworks concerning assisted dying. In the second chapter a care-based 
ethic was established. This was illustrated by a description of the various care-based roles 
connected with the individual who requests assistance. From this position, a care-based ethic 
specifically pertinent to the individual who requests assistance was developed in both the 
second and third chapters. This highlighted the role of attempted statutory legislation, DPP 
guidance and contemporary medical law cases. Building on these previous chapters, in 
Chapter Four regulatory frameworks concerning four paradigmatic scenarios were 
reimagined from a care-based perspective established earlier in this thesis. Chapter One 
considered the current legal regulatory frameworks concerning assisted dying. This first 
chapter began with a discussion of the evaluation of the “eligibility criteria” contained in the 
attempted legislative Bills. In placing this at the start of Chapter One I was able to show that 
the assisted dying legislation and regulation should not be viewed as only applicable for those 
who have been diagnosed with a terminal illness, nor that the concept of suffering is 
inextricably linked to a medical diagnosis. This analysis included a brief example of 
individuals who live with dementia and a comparative assessment of legislation concerning 
assisted dying in the Netherlands and Belgium respectively. This gave me the opportunity to 
establish that the individual who requests assistance does not exist solely in a medical 
vacuum or in the last six-months of life. Rather the individual who requests assistance is 
premised on a subjective understanding of suffering.  
Against this background I evaluated the role of the DPP’s guidelines and the decision on the 
death of Daniel James. This evaluation resulted in arguing that there had been de facto de-
criminalisation of a specific familial and compassionate assistance. In this chapter I raised the 
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associated implications connected with the use of family and compassion. I argued that 
compassion should not be connected to a disability and that the individual is no less 
compassionate because they agree that the individual should end their life. Instead, the use of 
compassion masked the DPP’s reliance on an autonomous right to die. Further to this, in this 
chapter I argued that who can assist but avoid prosecution still remains ambiguous. With 
recourse to the decision on the death of Daniel James, I argued that the DPP should have 
given more consideration to the discussion of non-prosecution of the family friend. 
Ultimately, it appears that the traditional familial paradigm and extended familial relationship 
could avoid prosecution However, I argued that this relational definition remains ambiguous. 
This then led to a discussion of who should assist. With recourse to the principle approach 
established in Chapter One, I argued that health and social care professionals respectively 
should take on the role of assistance. This was argued for two primary reasons; firstly, where 
there is no familial assistance available the health and social care professional are the only 
appropriately trained actors who can assist. Secondly, and building on the first point raised, 
health and social care professionals (depending on what type of assistance is being provided) 
have the knowledge and experience to provide a safe and painless death. In addition, this 
chapter also discussed why it was important for the health and social care professional to 
discuss assisted dying with the individual who requires assistance; it reflects the reality of the 
individual who requests assistance and the associated end of life questions and options that 
arise in this context.  
In Chapter Two, I provided a brief description of how a care-based ethic has developed and 
argued that a care ethic should be premised on a positive private relational interaction. 
Building on this introductory context I discussed the role of autonomy in connection with the 
individual that requires assistance. I argued that a care-based approach can support individual 
decision-making. In the context of assisted dying I advocated the use of a procedural-based 
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approach to autonomy. I argue that the use of reflection is theoretically apt for end of life 
decision-making and reflects the values and preferences that are inextricably linked the 
decision-making process both for individuals with capacity and the comparison that can be 
made with the substituted judgment test as part of the MCA. From this basis I argued that a 
care-based understanding of the family should be premised on sentiment, emotion and 
material aid. By applying this definition, this chapter defined familial care-labour without a 
normative expectation of maternal and positive practices of care. This means that a plurality 
of caring practices and experiences can be incorporated into how we reconceptualise the role 
of assistance in a regulatory framework. 
The role of the health care professional was also discussed in this chapter. I argued that the 
professional care role should be governed (predominantly) by Tronto’s principled approach 
to care. It will be established that the health care professional should deploy the principles of 
attentiveness, responsibility and competency. In addition, this chapter has recalibrated the 
meaning of responsiveness as an active recognition of the patient who requests assistance. 
The discussion of professional care roles and its connection with societal engagement was 
underpinned by a communitarian approach to community responsibility for care. The final 
part of this chapter discussed the role of state agencies and their relationship with care. I 
argued that in order to achieve competent and successful care, care labour (both private and 
public) must be appropriately valued financially. This means that the state must facilitate 
care. With recourse to a discussion of the level of state facilitation of care this chapter 
concluded that the state must support a regulatory framework for assisted dying. This chapter 
has highlighted the importance of defining the care-based roles pertinent to each care actor 
without which care could be stripped of its societal and relational value and therefore the 
abilities to recognise the complexities and nuances which are inextricably linked to the 
plurality of caring relationships.  
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Having established a care ethic that is appropriate for the individual who requests assistance,  
in Chapter Three I discussed three contemporary medical law cases; Aintree, Briggs and 
Nicklinson. The two former cases were used to highlight the decision-making process 
concerning withdrawal of treatment. In support of Lady Hale’s dicta in Aintree I argued that 
the determination of futility should be premised on a subjective understanding of the 
individual in question. In contrast, this chapter argued that when considering withdrawal 
intending death is a practiced and legitimate exercise. In addition, I argued that a substituted 
judgment is the most appropriate way to determine the interests of the individual that lacks 
capacity. This chapter then contrasted the judicial reasoning in Nicklinson. It is here where 
the legal inconsistencies between contemporary medical law cases (withdrawal of treatment 
and refusal treatment) were compared and resulted in a conclusion that there was an informal 
and implicit regulatory framework. An analysis of Nicklinson also included the argument that 
judicial reasoning failed to explicitly recognise any right to die arguments and the relational 
realities of assistance.  
The final chapter concerned how a care-based approach can reconceptualise a regulatory 
framework for assisted dying. This was achieved by discussing the four paradigmatic 
circumstances that exemplify the individual who requests assistance. It was first 
demonstrated that a care-based understanding would not allow a regulatory response to a 
request for assistance from individuals who have both mental and physical capacity. This was 
then contrasted with the second scenario concerning individuals who lack physical capacity 
but have mental capacity. In this section I argued that a care-based approach to process-based 
autonomy supports a legal framework which supports autonomous decision-making in 
choosing to die. This chapter then discussed how decisions are made on behalf of those who 
lack both physical and mental capacity. This discussion focussed substantially on the best 
interest test. I argued that the best interest test should be utilised but be inclusive of a 
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substituted judgment. However the substituted judgment should be broadened in scope to 
include a representative view of how the practice of care can influence both formal and 
informal structures that determine the views of others. Building on this, this thesis then 
contrasted the conceptual differences between passive and active euthanasia in response to 
individuals living with dementia. The final part of this chapter then focussed on the 
importance of the knowledge and expertise of the health care professional and suggested that 
they should be included as active members in a new regulatory model for assisted dying. This 
chapter then ended with a discussion of the right to assistance from a care-based perspective 
of relational interaction.  
This thesis has illustrated the inextricable link between death, dying and care. If assisted 
dying is to be appropriately regulated such a framework must reflect the realities of care both 
in the private and public domain and the influence this has on legislative safeguards, 
professional care providers and state provision of care respectively. By legislating from a 
care-based perspective, a deeper response which is reflective of the complexities of this 
scenario can be achieved. Although this may mean a more complex and problematic 
regulatory process I argue that this is the best mechanism to ensure we legislate in favour of 
assisted dying successfully. Care incorporates all parts of our life and yet it is disregarded 
when we discuss death, dying and assisted dying. If we are to appropriately reconceptualise a 
regulatory framework for the individual who requests assistance we must engage with the 
realities of care. By doing this we can establish a better experience for those connected to 
requests for assistance to end life who both provide and receive such care. 
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